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NOTES
EXPANDING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: THE USE
OF SECTION 362 AND SECTION 105 TO PROTECT
SOLVENT EXECUTIVES OF DEBTOR
CORPORATIONS
The fact that a proceeding is equitable does not give the judge a free-
floating discretion to redistribute rights in accordance with his per-
sonal views of justice and fairness, however enlightened those views
may be.1
INTRODUCTION
Every bankruptcy petition filed by or against a debtor trig-
gers the automatic stay.2 The automatic stay is a prophylactic
' In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 791 F.2d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Posner, J.). Judge Posner went on to describe the purpose behind equitable proceedings
in bankruptcy.
The function of equitable considerations in a bankruptcy proceeding is to
guide the division of a pie that is too small to allow each creditor to get the
slice for which he originally contracted... Hence, if the bankrupt is solvent
the task for the bankruptcy court is simply to enforce creditors' rights accord-
ing to the tenor of the contracts that created those rights ....
Id. This Note will address circumstances where a solvent, individually liable third party
obtains bankruptcy protection under 11 U.S.C. section 362 and 11 U.S.C. section 105. As
a result of this protection, creditors are precluded from seeking to recover against joint
tortfeasors. This result is even more contrary to the equitable function of the bankruptcy
courts envisioned by Judge Posner.
2 The filing of a voluntary as well as an involuntary petition operates as a stay
against the actions described in section 362(a). The automatic stay is codified at 11
U.S.C. section 362 and is considered "one of the fundamental debtor protections pro-
vided by the bankruptcy laws." HR REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Ses. 340 (1977); S.
REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 49, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 5787,5963, 6296-97.
Section 362(a) provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under
section 301, 302, or 303 of this title ... operates as a stay, applicable to all
entities, of-
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or em-
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
device that stops a broad range of proceedings against the
debtor immediately upon the bankruptcy filing.3 The stay pro-
tects the debtor during the duration of the bankruptcy proceed-
ing by enjoining creditors and other parties from, among other
things, seeking payment from the debtor for claims that arose
before the commencement of the case.4 Additional injunctive re-
ployment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or pro-
ceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced
before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the
case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the
estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case
under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of prop-
erty from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of
the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the
debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor
that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the
debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1983).
' The automatic stay goes into effect without any notice to creditors.
The policy behind this dramatic restraint without notice to the affected credi-
tors or parties in interest is to promote orderly administration of the estate. A
voluntary or involuntary petition is a non-public event. No one knows of the
petition save the clerk of the bankruptcy court and the debtor. The bank-
ruptcy court must have an opportunity to sort matters out and begin an or-
derly administration of the estate without interference by anxious creditors ...
. It is clear that the automatic stay is imposed upon the filing of the petition
with no notice given directly or indirectly to the affected parties in interest.
RICHARD I AAON, BANKupTcY LAW FuNDAMNTALs § 5.01(1) (1992).
4 The automatic stay bars any action against the debtor and property of the estate
on a claim that arose before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The Code broadly
defines the term "claim" and thus very few causes of action may proceed against the
debtor. The Code defines claim as a:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liqui-
dated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undis-
puted, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives
rise to right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is
reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undis-
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lief is also available to the debtor under section 105 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code ("Code").5 Section 105 grants the bankruptcy court
discretionary power to enjoin conduct that would adversely af-
fect the debtor, but which is not prevented by the automatic
stay.6
A situation occurring with increasing frequency-and the
focus of this Note-is the use of section 105 and the automatic
stay to enjoin suits against solvent third parties" who may, as a
result of the suit, have an indemnification claim against the
debtor that may diminish the estate and consequently, the re-
covery of other creditors.8 This Note addresses whether these
puted, secured, or unsecured.
11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1983). The stay does not, however, bar claims that arise after the
filing of the bankruptcy petition. See supra note 2, reprinting 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
5 Section 105(a) provides:
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or ap-
propriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title
providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to
preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determi-
nation necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules,
or to prevent an abuse of process.
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988).
6 See Cardinal Indus., Inc. v. Buckeye Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Cardinal In-
dus., Inc.), 105 B.R. 834 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989) (action brought by creditors against
nondebtor third parties holding nonestate property is not covered by automatic stay, yet
can be enjoined under section 105); Zenith Lab., Inc. v. Sinay (In re Zenith Lab., Inc.),
104 B.R. 659 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989) (court denied stay under section 362 to officers and
directors of debtor, instead upholding lower court's injunction of shareholders' direct
action under section 105); In re Monroe Well Serv., Inc., 67 B.R. 746 (Bankr. E.). Pa.
1986) (debtor's motion to enjoin creditors from exercising state-created rights against
nondebtors was sustained under section 105); Philadelphia Gold Corp. v. Fauzio (In re
Philadelphia Gold Corp.), 56 B.R. 87 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (court denied section 105
stay after holding that section 362 did not extend to solvent principal of debtor); Ven-
ture Prop., Inc. v. Norwood Group, Inc. (In re Venture Prop., Inc.), 37 B.R. 175 (Bankr.
D. N.L 1984) (court denied section 362 protection to the debtor/general partner's inter-
est in assets of partnership holding it was not property of the estate).
7 For the purposes of this Note, a solvent third party will include: an officer, direc-
tor, majority shareholder or partner of an insolvent company or partnership. This Note
will not address the issue of protection for guarantors and co-debtors. For a comprehen-
sive discussion of co-debtor stay principles and their application, see Barry L. Zaretsky,
Co-Debtor Stays in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 73 Cop.mNL L. Ray. 213 (1988).
8 This situation primarily arises when a creditor brings an action against the execu-
tives of a debtor corporation. Since the debtor would have to pay any judgment recov-
ered against the executive under an indemnification agreement, a suit against the solvent
third party would in effect be a suit against the debtor. As a result, the stay would fore-
close suits against the solvent third party. A right to indemnification can arise by statute
of the state of incorporation or by contract with the debtor corporation. See Robert L.
Jennings & Kenneth A. Horky, Indemnification of Corporate Officers and Directors, 15
1992]
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third parties are entitled to the derivative protection of the
debtor's petition and if so, under what section of the Bank-
ruptcy Code the action should be stayed and after what thresh-
old showing.
The tests developed by courts to gauge the effect of actions
against third parties vary widely.9 The traditional standard,
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 which demands a
showing of imminent and irreparable harm to the debtor, is re-
quired by some courts before issuing an injunction.10 A consider-
NOVA L. REV. 1357 (1991). There are numerous cases that address corporate officer in-
demnification in bankruptcy. See, e.g., A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin (In re A. H. Robins
Co.), 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1986) (court held the risk of indemnification costs to the
estate gave rise to "unusual circumstances" warranting an extension of section 362); Lo-
mas Fin. Corp. v. Northern Trust Co. (In re Lomas Fin. Corp.), No. 89-6602A (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1990) (bankruptcy court stayed creditors action seeking damages for
executive fraud under section 362, citing the existence of indemnification agreements),
aff'd, 117 B.R. 64 (S.D.N.Y.), remanded, 932 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1991) (case was remanded
because it was unclear whether bankruptcy court stayed action under section 362 or sec-
tion 105); North Star Contracting Corp. v. McSpedon (In re North Star Contracting
Corp.), 125 B.R. 368 (Banlkr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (court extended stay preventing creditor's
fraud action against debtor's president due to indemnification agreement); Circle K
Corp. v. Marks (In re The Circle K Corp.), 121 B.R. 257 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1990) (court
stayed creditors' securities fraud action against two former chief executive officers of
debtor, citing the existence of indemnification agreements).
But see Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of America v. Butler, 803 F.2d 61 (2d Cir.
1986) (denying stay to solvent partners of debtor due to partners' bad faith despite exis-
tence of indemnification agreements); CAE Indus. Ltd. v. Aerospace Holdings Co., 116
B.R. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (creditor's tortious interference suit against debtor's president
allowed to proceed despite indemnification agreement); In re Crazy Eddie Securities Li-
tig., 104 B.R. 582 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (stay denied to officers of debtor due to individual
liability on the claim); All Seasons Resorts, Inc. v. Milner (In re All Seasons Resorts,
Inc.), 79 B.R. 901 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987) (court declined to enjoin enforcement of
money judgment against officers of debtor despite a right of indemnification).
Compare A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 788 F.2d 994 (4th
Cir. 1986) (holding that a section 105 injunction can enjoin any action that might inter-
fere with the rehabilitation process) with Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of America v.
Butler, 803 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1986) (section 105 jurisdiction cannot extend to protect par-
ties engaged in bad faith, even if action would harm reorganization); compare also Uni-
versity Medical Ctr. v. American Sterilizer (In re University Medical Ctr.), 82 BR. 754
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (a section 105 injunction can issue only after a stiff Rule 65
threshold is met) with Garrity v. Leffiler (In re Neuman), 71 B.R. 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (a
section 105 injunction does not require a showing of irreparable harm to the debtor
before issuance).
10 Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs the procedural
aspect of obtaining an injunction, does not provide a specific standard to govern a court's
decision whether to grant an injunction. Courts have developed standards, however,
based on equitable concerns. The traditional standard requires that a movant seeking an
injunction show-.
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ably more lenient approach merely requires the debtor to show
the existence of an indemnification agreement between itself and
the third party to demonstrate potential impact on the
reorganization."'
Resolution of this issue is critical as the number of bank-
ruptcies involving potential indemnification claims increases.12
(1) irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted;
(2) a likelihood that the moving party will prevail on the merits;
(3) a balance of equities favor granting the injunction;
(4) an injunction would not be adverse to the public interest
J. MooRE nr A, 7 (Pt. 2) MOORE'S FEDERAL PRncr-CE 1 65.04[1] at 65-32 (1992). See also
Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C.L. Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 112 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc)
(adopting traditional four-part test); Auburn News Co. v. Providence Journal Co., 659
F.2d 273, 277 (1st Cir. 1981) (same). Federal Rule 65 is incorporated verbatim into bank-
ruptcy procedure via Bankruptcy Rule 7065. Fan. R. BANK. P. 7065 (1992). Some courts
have adapted this test to the bankruptcy context by requiring a showing of clear and
convincing evidence that serious harm will befall the debtor and the estate if the injunc-
tion does not issue. Compare Otero Mills, Inc. v. Security Bank & Trust (In re Otero
Mills, Inc.) 21 B.R. 777 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1982) (applying traditional standard in bank-
ruptcy context), with Codfish Corp. v. FDIC (In re Codfish Corp.), 97 B.R. 132, 135
(Bankr. D.P.R. 1988) (criticizing Otero Mills test as "too relaxed" and adopting clear
and convincing evidence requirement in bankruptcy cases), and GAF Corporation v.
Johns-Manville (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 26 B.R. 405, 415 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(applying "stringent standard" of Rule 7065 of the bankruptcy procedure rules).
11 See North Star Contracting Corp. v. McSpedon (In re North Star Contracting
Corp.), 125 B.R. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (existence of indemnification agreement authorized
stay protecting debtor's president); Lomas Fin. Corp. v. Northern Trust Co. (In re Lo-
mas Fin. Corp.), No. 89-6602A (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1990). The Lomas court held
that-
[The usual equitable grounds for relief, such as irreparable damage, need not
be shown [in a proceeding for an injunction under section 105(a)]. Instead the
bankruptcy court may "enjoin proceedings in other courts when it is satisfied
that such a proceeding would defeat or impair its jurisdiction with respect to a
case before it."
Slip op. at 15 (citations omitted) (quoting Garrity v. Leffler (In re Neuman), 71 B.R. 567,
571 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) and LTV Steel Co., Inc. v. Board of Education of Cleveland (In re
Chateaugay), 93 B.R. 26, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)). See also Eastern Airlines v. Rolleston (In
re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 111 B.R. 423, 431 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (irreparable harm
need not be shown before issuing a section 105 injunction).
12 In 1991, 87,723 businesses filed for bankruptcy protection, an increase of 100%
since 1981. 1992 FEDnam OFPIcE op STATIrcs. Ain. REP. 32. Concurrently, the number
of officer liability suits has also grown. See David W. Ichel & Sharon 0. Thompson,
Directors' and Officers' Insurance Coverage: An Ouerview and Current Issues, 334 PLY
Lrr 257 (1987) ("During the past two decades, lawsuits against corporate officers and
directors have increased dramatically, reflecting in part the explosion in hostile contests
for corporate control, large-scale bankruptcies of major corporations and the growth of
the plaintiffs' securities bar."). The increase in corporate officer liability can also be at-
tributed to the landmark corporate governance case of Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d
858 (DeL 1985). In that case, the court held nine Trans Union directors personally liable
1992]
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The lenient standard for extension of the stay has been used by
some as a shield for their allegedly fraudulent acts. 13 This Note
argues that when the automatic stay is used to protect solvent
third parties, the plain meaning and legislative intent of the
statute is violated, the protection granted overbroad and the
stayed party harmed. First, this Note develops the background
and legislative history of sections 362 and 105. Next, it reviews
how courts have interpreted third party stays under sections 362
and 105. This Note then argues that section 362 stays should be
restricted to the debtor and property of the estate. Finally, that
section 105 injunctions should be available only in those cases
where the debtor can satisfy a Rule 65 standard. When section
105 injunctive protection is extended without a Rule 65 thresh-
old showing, unwarranted injunctions are issued which grant un-
deserved immunity from suit and further harm the enjoined
party.
I. SECTION 362: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND INTENT
Section 362 protects the debtor for the duration of the
bankruptcy proceeding, acting like a preliminary injunction, bar-
ring any action against the debtor or the estate.1 4 The exceptions
for failing to exercise adequate business judgment in approving a merger. The holding in
that case resulted in a "'record number' of cases holding directors and officers liable for
breaches of their duties of care and loyalty." Pamela H. Bucy, Indemnification of Corpo-
rate Executives Who have been Convicted of Crimes: An Assessment and Proposal, 24
IND. L. REV. 279, 329 (1991).
This Note argues that the increase in bankruptcy filings combined with an increase
in corporate officer liability suits demands a uniform approach to these suits.
13 For cases involving corporate officer fraud in bankruptcy, see Teachers Ins. &
Annuity Ass'n of America v. Butler, 803 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1986) (action by TIAA against
real estate development company partners for bad faith dealings relating to investment
deal); North Star Contracting Corp. v. McSpedon (In re North Star Contracting Corp.),
125 B.R. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (action against president of debtor for fraudulent misrepre-
sentation); Lomas Fin. Corp. v. Northern Trust Co. (In re Lomas Fin. Corp.), 117 B.R.
64 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (action against treasurer and vice president of debtor for fraudulent
misrepresentation); Circle K Corp. v. Marks (In re Circle K Corp.), 121 B.R. 257 (Bankr.
D. Ariz. 1990) (action against two former chief executive officers alleging securities
fraud); Philadelphia Gold Corp. v. Fauzio (In re Philadelphia Gold Corp.), 56 B.R. 87
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (action against principal of debtor for fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion); Bondy v. Vitarine Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (In re Vitarine Pharmaceuticals, Inc.), No.
CV-91-1631, Relief Hearing, Judge Burton R. Lifland (Sept. 19, 1991) (creditors' and
shareholders' action against debtor's president for fraud).
" See Kommanditselskab Supertrans v. O.C.C. Shipping, Inc., 79 B.R. 534
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (court stayed creditors' fraudulent conveyance action against principals
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to the stay are limited15 so that the estate is protected to the
greatest extent possible in order to achieve the primary purpose
of debtor even though debtor had already transferred property, holding that, rather than
seeking damages for fraud, the creditors' action was in reality seeking to enforce a judg-
ment against the estate); Cement Antitrust Litig. v. Penn-Dixie Indus., Inc. (In re Penn-
Dixie Indus., Inc.), 6 B.PR 832 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (court denied creditor relief from
the stay in order to seek discovery from debtor, holding that compliance with the request
would violate the purpose behind the automatic stay).
"I The exceptions to the conduct barred by 11 U.S.C. section 362(a) are contained in
section 362(b) which provides in part:
The filing of a petition ... does not operate as a stay-
(1) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement or continua-
tion of a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor,
(2) under subsection (a) of this section, of the collection of alimony, main-
tenance, or support from property that is not property of the estate;
(3) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act to perfect an interest in
property to the extent that the trustee's rights and powers are subject to such
perfection under section 546(b) of this title or to the extent that such act is
accomplished within the period provided under section 547(e)(2)(A) of this
title;
(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or con-
tinuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such
governmental unit's police or regulatory power,
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judg-
ment, other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a
governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory
power,
(6) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a commodity bro-
ker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institutions, or securi-
ties clearing agency of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with
commodity contracts, as defined in section 761(4) of this title, forward con-
tracts, or securities contracts, defined in section 741(7) of this title, that consti-
tutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for a margin payment, as defined
in section 101(34), 741(5), or 761(15) of this title, or settlement payment, as
defined in section 101(35) or 741(8) of this title, arising out of commodity con-
tracts, forward contracts, or securities contracts against cash, securities, or
other property held by or due from such commodity broker, forward contract
merchant, stockbroker, financial institutions, or securities clearing agency to
margin, guarantee, secure, or settle commodity contracts, forward contracts, or
securities contracts.
11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (1992). For interpretations of section 362(b) see Corporacion de
Servicios Medicos Hospitalarios de Fajardo v. Mora (In re Corporacion de Servicios
Medicos Hospitalarios de Fajardo), 805 F.2d 440 (1st Cir. 1986) (action by governmental
unit to recover on a contractual claim was barred as it did not fall within police powers
exception section 362(b)(4)); Freeman v. Commissioner, 799 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1986)
(after debtor filed for chapter 11, court of appeals affrmed a lower court tax ruling
against the debtor holding that, as the debtor initiated the appeal, which was thus not a
"proceeding against the debtor," the stay did not bar affilration of the judgment); Com-
monwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. E.P.A. (In re Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co.), 805 F.2d 1175 (5th




of the bankruptcy code: rehabilitation of the debtor.16
Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code gives immediate relief,
granting the debtor an opportunity to reorganize and implement
an orderly administration of the estate.1 The stay protects the
debtor from any attempt by a creditor to obtain possession or
perfect a lien or security interest on estate property.18 Barring a
grant of relief by the court, the stay lasts until the debtor is
discharged from bankruptcy."9
16 Rehabilitation of the debtor is the primary purpose of a chapter 11 business
reorganization.
[T]he paramount policy and goal of Chapter 11, to which all other bankruptcy
policies are subordinated, is the rehabilitation of the debtor. This policy was
clearly articulated by the United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984) ... which stated "[t]he fundamental purpose of
reorganization is to prevent the debtor from going into liquidation, with an
attendant loss of jobs and possible misuse of economic resources."
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Rolleston (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 111 B.R. 423, 430
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (quoting In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174, 176-77
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989)).
In a chapter 11 business reorganization, important economic policies such as preser-
vation of jobs and constructive use of capital mandate that bankruptcy proceedings be
tailored toward guiding entities through difficult times.
17 "Section 362 provides for a broad stay of litigation, lien enforcement, and other
actions, judicial or otherwise, which would affect or interfere with property of the estate,
property of the debtor, or property in the custody of the estate." LAWRENCE P. KING ET
AL., 2 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY 1 362.0, at 362-8 (15th ed. 1988). For the text of 11 U.S.C.
section 362(a), see supra note 2.
18 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The scope of what constitutes property of the estate has
been the focus of numerous cases in recent years. See, e.g., Advanced Ribbons & Office
Prods., Inc. v. Interstate Distrib., Inc. (In re Advanced Ribbons & Office Prods., Inc.),
125 B.R. 259 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991) (shares of corporate debtor not deemed to be prop-
erty of estate and therefore post-petition sale of 100% of debtor's stock was upheld);
Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v. Esselen Assocs., Inc. (In re Crysen/Montenay Energy
Co.), 902 F.2d 1098 (2d Cir. 1990) (prepetition tort action held to belong to estate, not to
agent/debtor and not to principal/seller); In re S.I. Acquisition, 817 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir.
1987) (alter ego cause of action is property of the estate); In re Hooker Int'l, Inc., 116
B.R. 375 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (prepetition tort claim could not be commenced by co-
assignee, cause of action deemed property of the estate); In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 109
B.R. 748 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989) (stay prohibited lender from foreclosing on property
held by limited partnership where general partner was debtor); Official Comm. of Un-
secured Creditors v. PSS Steamship Co. (In re Prudential Lines, Inc.), 114 B.R. 27
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (court stayed sole shareholder of debtor from taking post confir-
mation worthless stock deduction prior to confirmation of a plan), af'd, 928 F.2d 565 (2d
Cir. 1991).
1" The automatic stay expires when any of the following occur: (1) when the case is
closed; (2) when the case is dismissed; or (3) if a discharge is granted or denied under a
chapter of title 11. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2) (1983). A discharge operates to relieve the
debtor from any future actions that seek restitution on claims that could have been
brought before the commencement of the case. See 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1983). As a result,
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Although the benefits of the stay seem to weigh heavily in
favor of the debtor, the stay also protects the majority of credi-
tors from the few that would otherwise be able to secure pay-
ment at the majority's expense.2 0 Absent section 362, creditors
would be forced to rush to court to file actions and obtain judg-
ments against the debtor.21 Thus, the section 362 stay ensures
that bankruptcy will be an orderly proceeding where all credi-
tors are treated equally.2 2
While the general purpose of the stay-to provide immedi-
ate and broad injunctive relief to the debtor and the estate-is
largely accepted, the scope of the automatic stay is controversial
because it goes into effect immediately without any notice to
creditors and often at the eleventh hour of the debtor's financial
problems. As a result, the stay has been labeled the "flashpoint"
of the bankruptcy proceeding.23 Protection afforded by the stay
when the stay expires at discharge, the discharge works to enjoin permanently any recov-
ery by the creditor for a prepetition claim against the debtor. What remains unclear is
whether staying actions against third parties for the duration of the bankruptcy proceed-
ing has the effect of permanently enjoining the action. This result occurs when a creditor
who has a potential claim against a solvent executive is enjoined from pursuing the ac-
tion during the reorganization since the debtor is a joint torifeasor with the executive.
When a stay expires upon the confirmation of a plan, the resulting discharge does not
affect the rights or obligations of solvent third parties. But see In re A.H. Robins Co.,
131 B.&. 292 (E.D. Va. 1991) (debtor's plan provided for a permanent injunction barring
any future medical malpractice claims against doctors relating to injuries suffered as a
result of the Dalkon Shield).
20 If the automatic stay did not exist to protect the debtor in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing, the first creditor to obtain and docket a judgment against the debtor's assets would
be able to recover the full amount of its claim at the expense of other creditors. The stay
also gives the debtor a chance to reorganize, pay off the claims over an extended period
of time and potentially pay a higher percentage of the claims than it would in a liquida-
tion. A successful reorganization also preserves jobs and capital See CoLLzm ON B~mx-
RUPTOY, supra note 17, 362.01 at 362-8.
21 The race to the courthouse occurs because, under most state lava, creditors are
paid according to the time they docket their judgments against the debtor. See e.g., N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. L & R. 5201 (McKinney 1991).
1 See HR REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CAN.
5963, 6297.
I' One scholar describes the breadth of the stay as
also entic[ing] debtors to invoke bankruptcy as a last effort to stave off credi-
tors. Lawyers know of too many instances where the debtor seeks counsel at
the eleventh hour. The foreclosure sale may be scheduled for the following
morning when the debtor first seeks help. The bankruptcy court clerk is accus-
tomed to receiving hastily and hand drawn bankruptcy petitions the clear ob-
jective of which is to stay some action by creditors scheduled a few hours
hence. Understandably, then, the automatic stay is the first flashpoint in any
bankruptcy case. The creditor has gone through a long and expensive process
1992]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
will even impinge on state law foreclosure rights of creditors that
have already commenced such proceedings.24
The legislative intent behind section 362 is briefly stated.
The language of section 362 refers only to the debtor and not to
co-debtors or third parties.2 5 Congress described section 362 as
one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bank-
ruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It
stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions.
It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan,
or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove him into
bankruptcy.2
'8
The stay explicitly protects the debtor, as the plain-meaning in-
terpretation suggests, and implicitly protects the creditor, as the
legislative history suggests.27 What remains unclear is whether
the stay was intended to protect the interests of solvent third
parties.28
II. SECTION 105: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND INTENT
The automatic stay applies to all actions against the debtor
and property of the estate. However, it does not necessarily
with only hours away from a sheriff's sale. He is bound to feel frustration and
outrage when the fruit of all this effort is stymied by a last moment petition.
AARON, supra note 3, at § 5.01[1].
2, See In're Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1984) (creditor obtained
judgment of foreclosure under Wisconsin law before debtor filed chapter 11 petition, yet
foreclosure proceeding was automatically stayed upon filing of petition).
25 For the text of section 362(a), see supra note 2.
20 S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54-55, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.N. 5787,
5840-5841 (emphasis added).
2 The stay protects creditors by preventing an erosion of estate assets by other
creditors enforcing judgments. The legislative history states:
The automatic stay also provides creditor protection. Without it, certain credi-
tors would be able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor's property.
Those who acted first would obtain payment of the claims in preference to and
to the detriment of other creditors. Bankruptcy is designed to provide an or-
derly liquidation procedure under which all creditors are treated equally.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N, 593,
6297; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 49, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CAN. 5787, 5835.
28 Some courts are reluctant to extend stay protection to solvent third parties. See,
e.g., Nofziger Communications, Inc. v. Birks, 757 F. Supp. 80 (D.D.C. 1991) (court denied
a motion made by nonbankrupt co-assignees to consolidate an action with a similar one
brought against debtor co-assignees, holding that consolidation was inappropriate on the
theory that consolidation would entitle nonbankrupt assignee to automatic stay
protection).
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cover all situations that are detrimental to the debtor's rehabili-
tation. 9 In anticipation, Congress enacted section 105 which en-
abled courts to enjoin actions not covered by the automatic
stay.30 Section 105 grants authority to the bankruptcy court to
"issue any order, process or judgment that is necessary to carry
out the provisions of this title." 311 It differs significantly from a
2' There are a number of potential situations not covered by the automatic stay that
can have a detrimental impact on the reorganization of the debtor. One example is a suit
by a creditor to recover on a guaranty. See, e.g., Otoe County Nat'! Bank v. W & P
Trucking, Inc., 754 F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1985) (automatic stay was not extended to in-
clude guarantor of debtor); GATX Aircraft Corp. v. M/V Courtney Leigh, 768 F.2d 711
(5th Cir. 1985) (court denied stay to co-guarantors of insolvent guarantors, holding auto-
matic stay only protects the debtor); Bill Roderick Distrib., Inc. v. A.J. Mackay Co. (In
re A.J. Mackay Co.), 50 B.R. 756 (D. Utah 1985) (since principal of debtor did not file for
bankruptcy protection, court lacked jurisdiction over him and could not extend stay pro-
tection to him); Plessey Precision Metals Inc. v. Metal Ctr., Inc. (In re Metal Ctr., Inc.),
31 B.R. 458 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983) (automatic stay protection denied to guarantor be-
cause debtor would not be bound by any judgment recovered on the guaranty).
Potential damage to the reorganization arises when the guarantor volunteers to aid
the reorganization if given protection from actions to recover on the guarantee. If protec-
tion is denied, the reorganization is in jeopardy. See Gathering Restaurant, Inc. v. First
Nat'l Bank of Valparaiso (In re Gathering Restaurant, Inc.), 79 B.R. 992 (Bankr. NJ).
Ind. 1986) (granting limited injunction to protect guarantor because funding from guar-
antor was only means to reorganize debtor).
Another example of an action that threatens the reorganization but is not prevented
by the automatic stay is the enforcement of Hens against nonestate property which is
required for a successful reorganization. See In re Monroe Well Serv., Inc., 67 B.R 746
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (action was not prevented by the automatic stay, but section 105
authorized an injunction where failure to enjoin action would result in irreparable harm
to the debtor).
11 2 COLLIER ON BANrRupTCY, supra note 17, % 105.02, at 105-5 ("IT]he actions and
conduct against non-debtor parties which are not protected by the automatic stay may
be subject to specific injunctive relief under section 105(a).").
31 11 U.S.C. section 105(a). For the full text of section 105(a), see supra note 5. The
pertinent legislative history of section 105 was tersely stated in committee at the p aing
of section 362. "[T]he court has ample other powers to stay actions not covered by the
automatic stay. Section 105, of proposed title 11, derived from Bankruptcy Act section
2a(15), grants the power to issue orders necessary or appropriate to carry out the provi-
sions of title 11." HR REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 342, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5963, 6298. Section 105 can be used to fill in gaps in section 362 but
"does not authorize the bankruptcy court to create rights not othervise available under
applicable law." Southern Ry. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 1985).
See also In re Johns-Manville Corp., 40 B.R. 219 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 194) (court enjoined
discovery of debtor by codefendants who were unable to stay litigation, utilizing the
broad injunctive power of the bankruptcy court under section 105); Zenith Lab., Inc. v.
Sinay (In re Zenith Lab., Inc.), 104 B.R. 659 (D.N.J. 1989) (in a shareholder action
against corporate directors and officers, court held that policy purchased to indemnify
officers was not property of the estate and therefore suit did not fall vithin the purview
of section 362; however, the action was enjoined under section 105 as a threat to a suc-
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section 362 stay in that a section 105 injunction does not arise
automatically upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. Section
105 empowers a bankruptcy court to enjoin conduct that may
adversely affect the reorganization of the debtor but which is not
prevented by the automatic stay.3 2 The focus of this Note is
what the proper showing of harm should be before a court can
enjoin a creditor from proceeding against an officer of a debtor
company. Harm to the estate may arise, for example, if the of-
ficer has an indemnification agreement with the debtor. The new
burden on the estate is that of reimbursing the officer for litiga-
tion costs and any potential judgment arising out of the litiga-
tion. This type of suit may be enjoined by section 105 since, in
certain circumstances, the risk of indemnification would place a
new burden on the estate and might adversely affect the
reorganization. 3
cessful reorganization); Eastern Airlines, Inc, v. Rolleston (In re Ionosphere Clubs), 111
B.R. 423 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (court extended protection to solvent codefendants be-
cause action might affect debtor adversely despite the fact that claims against debtor
and codefendants presented common issues of law and fact which could be resolved in
one proceeding).
32 See COLLIER ON BANKRupTcy, supra note 17, 1 105.02, at 105-5. Section 105 is
similar to the All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, which empowers the federal courts to
"issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agree-
able to the usages and principles of law." Id. The All Writs Statute was made applicable
to bankruptcy courts under section 213 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Section
213 was repealed by the 1984 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. Pub. L. No. 98-353,
98 Stat. 333 (1984). This effectively left section 105 as the sole statutory basis for the
exercise of All Writs power.
3 The new burden on the estate is the indemnification claims arising as a result of
the action against the third party. The court in A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin (In re A.H.
Robbins Co.), 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1986), enjoined actions against officers of the
debtor, stating.
[I]n great measure the suits being pursued against [Robins'] officers and em-
ployees are in reality derivative of identical claims brought against [Robins],
which if sustained against the officers and employees would expose the estate
"to claims for contribution and indemnification" and might result in collateral
estoppel against the debtor "in subsequent actions." ... It [is] ... proper to
stay these actions and discovery "against [such] non-debtors which would frus-
trate the statutory scheme or impact adversely on a debtor's ability to formu-
late a plan or on debtor's property."
Id. at 1005 (quoting Johns-Manville, 26 B.R. 405, 427 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
The argument is made that the risk of impact in Robins and Manville was so vast as
to make them the exceptional cases for broad injunctive power. Both Manville (asbestos)
and Robins (Dalkon Shield intrauterine device "I.U.D.") involved thousands of injured
plaintiffs seeking to recover for permanent injuries, pain, suffering and, in many cases,
wrongful death. The impact in "normal" bankruptcy proceedings where thousands of
actions are not pending against the debtor discounts the breadth of these interpreta-
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Section 105 has primarily been used to define the scope of
the bankruptcy court's injunctive power."' The 1978 expansion
of bankruptcy jurisdiction 5 grants bankruptcy courts the power
to maintain the integrity of the Code under section 105.2" With
its broadened grant of jurisdiction, the Code permits a court to
tions. See All Seasons Resorts, Inc. v. Milner (In re All Seasons Resorts, Inc.), 79 B.
901 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987). In assessing the impact of an action against the debtor's
codefendants who were officers and agents of the corporation, the All Seasons court
stated:
This is not a case of special circumstances. Although there is a closeness be-
tween debtor and codefendants by reason of their officer and agent status and
their right to indemnification pursuant to debtor's bylaws, the magnitude of
the harm to debtor if no stay is in force does not approach the scope of the
potential injuries besetting the debtors in Robins and Johns-Manville.
Id. at 904.
-, The statutory parent of section 105 was section 2(a)(15) of the Bankruptcy Act of
1898. In 1978 Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act which replaced section
2(a)(15) with section 105. 2 CoLLuR oN BmKm -'puc supra note 17, 1 105.01, at 105-4.
Section 105 has primarily been used as a source of injunctive power for the bankruptcy
court. Under the tradition standard, a court issued a section 105 injunction only when
the movant met the stiff requirements outlined in Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Glassman v. Electronic Theatre Restaurants Corp. (In re Electronic The-
atre Restaurants Corp.), 53 B.R. 458 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (district court reversed a section
105 injunction because the bankruptcy court failed to establish risk of irreparable harm);
Codfish Corp. v. FDIC (In re Codfish Corp.), 97 B.R. 132, 135 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1988)
(court granted section 105 injunction to protect debtor's president only after strict Rule
65 standard was met plus movant must establish clear and convincing evidence warrant-
ing an injunction); In re Trails End Lodge, Inc., 45 B.R. 597, 601 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984)
(court denied section 105 protection to officer and shareholder guarantors of debtor, cit-
ing failure to meet standard for a preliminary injunction); Venture Prop., Inc. v. Nor-
wood Group, Inc. (In re Venture Prop., Inc.), 37 B.R. 175 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1984) (court
denied section 105 injunction to prevent sale of real property owned by partnership of
which debtor was general partner due to lack of irreparable injury to debtor).
33 The broadening of bankruptcy courts' equitable power derives primarily from the
1977 changes to the jurisdictional provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The 1938 bank-
ruptcy act, which substantially revised the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, confined the juris-
diction of courts to "the debtor and his property, wherever located." Act of June 22,
1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 906 (1938). The Bankruptcy Act of 1893 was repealed by the
Bankrupicy Code of 1978. The revision of bankruptcy jurisdiction expanded the jurisdic-
tion of the court to include "all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or
related to cases under title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b); HR. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 445 (1977), reprinted in 1978 US.C.C.AN. 5963, 6400. The 1984 changes to the
Bankruptcy Code followed the Supreme Court decision in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co.
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). In Marathon the Supreme Court over-
ruled 28 U.S.C. section 1471(b) which granted bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over "all
civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11." Id.
at 54. This Note does not address the jurisdictional issues raised by the Supreme Court
in Marathon and the resulting changes passed by Congress.
"' For a comparison of section 105 to the All Writs Act, see supra note 32.
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extend protection to third parties when the integrity of the es-
tate is at risk.17 The text of section 105, however, does not pro-
vide a standard to determine what conduct threatens the integ-
rity of the estate."8 The legislative history of the Code and the
Code itself, however, do provide significant insight into the stan-
dard required for section 105 relief.
When Congress enacted section 362, it took the opportunity
to describe the operation of section 105, stating that injunctions
which are not automatic could "be granted or issued under the
usual rules for the issuance of injunctions." 9 Congress appar-
ently intended a different standard for injunctive relief under
section 105 than under section 362.40 The only clear requirement
for a section 362 stay is to file for bankruptcy; section 105 relief,
on the other hand, requires a showing under "the usual rules for
the issuance of an injunction."41
The "usual rules" for granting injunctive relief in general
civil litigation are provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. A number of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
been incorporated into the Bankruptcy Procedural Rules. Rule
37 Describing the power of section 105, COLLIERS states:
Section 105 is much broader [than its predecessor], and constitutes a major
departure from that law in that it is in no way circumscribed by possession or
custody of a res. Unlike the restriction under prior law that an order of a bank-
ruptcy court must be "necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this
title," section 105 authorizes the bankruptcy court to also issue orders "appro-
priate to carry out the provisions of this title." This change evidences Con.
gress' intent that bankruptcy courts would, under the Bankruptcy Code, deal
with all phases and aspects of a bankruptcy case.
2 COLLIERS ON BANKRupTcy, supra note 17, % 105.01 at 105-3-4.
38 For the text of Section 105, see supra note 5.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 342 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6298; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5837.
4' The only clear means to obtain section 362 stay relief is to file for bankruptcy.
The court in Minoco Group of Co.'s Ltd. v. First State Underwriters Agency of New
England Reinsurance Corp. (In re Minoco Group of Co.'s Ltd.), 799 F.2d 517 (9th Cir.
1986), held that the automatic stay is effective upon filing whether or not the debtor
would suffer irreparable harm in absence of the stay. Id. at 520. Thus, no standard of
harm is required for section 362 injunctive relief. Rather, a bankruptcy petition merely
has to be filed. By contrast, a section 105 injunction is not automatic upon filing. Con-
gress apparently intended that section 105 injunctive protection be warranted by a Rule
65 threshold standard.
41 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 342 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6298; S. RaP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5837.
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7065 of Bankruptcy Procedure makes Federal Rule 65 applicable
to bankruptcy courts governing the issuance of injunctions. In
fact, Rule 7065 is a verbatim repetition of Federal Rule 65.42
Thus, when Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, it
apparently intended Rule 7065 to be interpreted in the same
fashion as Federal Rule 65. Consequently, many courts require
the movant to demonstrate under a Rule 65 standard that: the
suit would harm the reorganization irreparably; the harm to the
creditor is minimal; and that the balance of equities tips in favor
of the debtor; an injunction would not be contrary to public pol-
icy.4  Nonetheless, section 105 has been interpreted by some
courts as a broad grant of injunctive power with no correspond-
ing Rule 65 limitation."
DI JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THIRD PARTY STAYS INBANKRUPTCY
The Code does not explicitly answer whether section 362
applies to solvent third parties and how section 105 applies to
solvent third parties. In In re Otero Mills, 5 the seminal case
interpreting the extension of sections 362 and 105 to solvent
third parties, the court held that section 105 protection could
extend to a debtor corporation's president after a showing of ir-
42 Rule 7065 of the Bankruptcy Procedure Rules provides: "Rule 65 F.R.Civ.P. ap-
plies in adversary proceedings, except that a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction may be issued on application of a debtor, trustee, or debtor in possetssion
without compliance with Rule 65(c)." FED. R. BANKS. P. 7065 (1992). Rule 65(c) requires
that the movant post security for compensation of a party that may be wrongfully
enjoined.
43 For cases that require a Rule 65 showing before the issuance of a section 105
injunction see supra note 34.
44 See In re Davis, 730 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1984) (the court stayed actions related to a
Manville proceeding by holding that section 105 authorized enjoining litigants from pur-
suing actions that threaten the integrity of a bankrupt's estate without meeting a rule 65
standard); Erti v. Paine Webber (In re Baldwin-United Corp.). 765 F.2d 343 (2d Cir.
1985) (court may use section 105 to insure the orderly conduct of reorganization proceed-
ings); Circle K Corp. v. Marks (In re Circle K Corp.), 121 B.R. 257 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1990)
(to issue a section 105 injunction, court must find that balance of hardship tips in favor
of debtor); Lomas Fin. v. Northern Trust Co. (In re Lomas Fin.), No. 89-6602A (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1990) (section 105 stay can issue when court perceives an impairment
of its jurisdiction); LTV Steel Co., Inc. v. Board of Educ. of Cleveland (In re Chateaugay
Corp.), 93 B.R. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (under section 105, the usual grounds for injunctions
such as irreparable harm need not be shown).
45 21 B.R. 777 (Bankr. D. N.IM 1982).
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reparable harm to the reorganization e.4  However, the court re-
fused to extend this protection under section 362, arguing that
the automatic stay did not extend beyond the debtor and prop-
erty of the estate.47
Since Otero Mills, courts have created a broad spectrum of
standards to determine whether bankruptcy protection should
extend to solvent third parties.48 At one end of the spectrum,
some courts broadly interpret sections 362 and 105 and, as a re-
sult, stay many third party actions.49 The justification proffered
for this interpretation is to protect the estate and facilitate the
rehabilitation of the debtor.50 At the other end of the spectrum,
section 362 is interpreted narrowly, leaving section 105 as the
only protection available to solvent third parties.51 Courts
40 Id. at 778.
47 Id. at 779.
8 Compare Ripley v. Mulroy, 80 B.R. 17 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (stay did not extend to
president of debtor corporation, allowing action brought by purchaser of promissory
notes alleging fraud), with Lomas Fin. Corp. v. Northern Trust Co. (In re Lomas Fin.
Corp.), 117 B.R. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stay did extend to officers of debtor corporation,
enjoining action brought by bank alleging fraud); Cf. Codfish Corp. v. FDIC (In re Cod-
fish Corp.), 97 B.R. 132 (Bankr. D. P.R. 1988) (section 105 injunction can issue upon a
showing of clear and convincing evidence that estate would be affected substantially and
adversely by continued action), with LTV Steel Co., Inc. v. Board of Educ. of Cleveland
(In re Chateaugay Corp.), 93 B.R. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (a section 105 injunction can issue
when the court is satisfied that the proceeding would impair its jurisdiction, irreparable
harm need not be shown).
49 See e.g., A.H. Robins v. Piccinin (In re A.H. Robins), 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1986)
(sections 105 and 362 prevent actions against third parties when there is such an identity
between the third party and the debtor that the debtor can be said to be the real party
in interest); North Star Contracting Corp. v. McSpedon (In re North Star Contracting
Corp.), 125 B.R. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (action against president of company violated auto-
matic stay, even though president was not a debtor, because it would seriously affect
both reorganization efforts and assets of debtor); Lesser v. A-Z Assoc. (In re Lion Capital
Group), 44 B.R. 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stayed defendants from proceeding with
their district court actions to avoid injury to the estate); Lomas Fin. Corp. v. Northern
Trust Co. (In re Lomas Fin. Corp.), 117 B.R. 64, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (affirming a bank-
ruptey court order extending protection to solvent executives of the debtor under both
section 362 and section 105).
5o See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots Ass'n Int'l (In re Ionosphere Clubs,
Inc.), 105 B.R. 773, 777 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("The purpose of the protection provided
by Chapter 11 is to give the debtor a breathing spell, an opportunity to rehabilitate its
business and to enable the debtor to generate revenue.").
" The following courts have held that section 362 applies to the debtor and prop-
erty of the estate and not to solvent third parties. Consequently, the only statutory alter-
native for protecting solvent third parties is section 105. See Teachers Ins. & Annuity
Ass'n of America v. Butler, 803 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1986); CAE Indus. Ltd. v. Aerospace
Holdings Co., 116 B.R. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litig., 104 B.R.
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adopting this approach generally limit the scope of section 362
to actions against the debtor and property of the estate, issuing
third party stays under section 105 only after a traditional Rule
65 standard is met.52
A. The Broad Approach: Section 362
The scope of section 362 was transformed with the Fourth
Circuit's opinion in A.H. Robins v. Piccinin3 and the birth of
the "unusual circumstances" test. A.H. Robins filed for bank-
ruptcy protection in response to the "avalanche of actions" filed
against it as a result of injuries sustained through the use of
Dalkon Shield I.U.D.s." The issue presented was whether the
automatic stay applied to A.H. Robins's solvent codefendants. 5
582 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); Ripley v. Mulroy, 80 B.R. 17 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Royal Truck &
Trailer, Inc. v. Armadora Maritima Salvadorena, S-., 10 B.R. 488 (N.D. IL 1981); Cod-
fish Corp. v. FDIC (In re Codfish Corp.), 97 B.R. 132 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1988); In re Arrow
Huss, Inc., 51 B.R. 853 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985); In re Anje Jewelry Co., 47 B.R. 485
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983).
2 See Codfish, 97 B.R. at 135-36. The Codfish court enjoined an action against the
president of the debtor under section 105 after a Rule 65 showing had been met and
clear and convincing evidence had been presented that continuation of the action would
substantially and adversely harm the debtor. Section 362 was held to apply only to the
debtor and not to solvent co-parties. See also Zenith Lab., Inc. v. Sinay (In re Zenith
Labs.), 104 B.R. 659, 662 (D.N.J. 1989). Respondents in this case had filed actions
against solvent officers of the debtor alleging securities laws violations. The bankruptcy
court stayed the actions against the officers under section 362 and stayed discovery re-
quests from the debtor under section 105.
The district court, on appeal, held that the officers' right to indemnification was
contingent and would therefore probably be disallowed under section 502(e)(1)(B), and
thus concluded that section 362 did not apply. The court went on to find that there was
risk of irreparable harm to the estate and stayed the entire action under section 105.
788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1986).
For a comprehensive history of the Dalkon Shield litigation, see Book Note, 99
HARv. L. Ray. 875 (1986) (reviewing S. ENGEITAYER & R. WAGM.N, LORD'S Jusincm ONE
JUDGE'S BArLE TO EXPOSE THE DEADLY DALxoN SHIELD LU.]). (1985)).
The Dalkon Shield was developed in the 1960s by Dr. Hugh Davis. In 1970 A-H.
Robins acquired all patent and marketing rights to the Dalkon Shield and began manu-
facturing and marketing the device. Robins discontinued the manufacture and sale of the
LU.D. in 1974 because of complaints and suits charging injury from the use of the device.
Stopping the sale and manufacture of the Dalkon Shield did little to stem the flow of
suits because A.H. Robins did not issue a recall of the device until 1985, when the chap-
ter 11 petition was filed. The filing of the petition automatically stayed all actions
against A.H. Robins as the debtor under section 362(a).
11 Certain injured plaintiffs had named defendants other than A.11 Robins in their
products liability suit and, after A.11 Robins's bankruptcy filing, sought to sever A.H.
Robins and proceed against the other defendants. The remaining codefendants were: (1)
Aetna, as the holder of A.1 Robins's liability coverage; (2) corporate officers of A.H.
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In extending the stay, the court reasoned that in "unusual cir-
cumstances" injunctive relief should be available to nonbank-
rupt codefendants.56 "Unusual circumstances" exist when a
judgment against a solvent party would in fact be a finding
against the debtor.6 7 Since A.H. Robins was required to indem-
nify certain codefendants, allowing litigation to proceed against
those codefendants would have the ultimate effect of further
taxing the debtor's estate and potentially jeopardizing the reor-
ganization.58 The court's justification for protecting these code-
fendants was the fact that they were derivatively liable with
A.H. Robins on the plaintiffs' claim and they were only being
sued by virtue of their positions as officers and employees of
Robins, and not due to any individual liability. Since these code-
fendants could not be found individually liable to the plaintiffs,
any judgment against them would essentially be a judgment
against Robins by virtue of the indemnification agreements. 9
Robins; and (3) the inventors of the Dalkon Shield, Dr. Hugh J. Davis and Dr. Frederick
A. Clark. Robins, 788 F.2d at 1007.
58 Id. at 999. The court quoted Royal Trucks & Trailer, Inc. v. Armadora Meritina
Salvadorenna, S.A., 10 B.R. 488 (N.D. M11. 1981) ("[S]omething more than the mere fact
that one of the parties to the lawsuit has filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition must be
shown in order that proceedings be stayed against nonbankrupt parties."). At first
glance, the "something more" in Robins appeared to be the risk of indemnification
claims to the estate. However, the court held that the codefendants should be protected
because they were not individually but rather derivatively liable with Robins on the
plaintiffs' claim. Robins, 788 F.2d at 999 citing In re Metal Center, 31 B.R. 458 (D.
Conn. 1983).
57 Robins, 788 F.2d at 999. The court held that when there is "such [an] identity
between the debtor and the third-party defendant that the debtor may be said to be the
real party defendant and that a judgment against the third-party will in effect be a judg-
ment or finding against the debtor," section 362 can be used to stay actions against the
third party. Id.
Id. at 1007-08.
" The Robins court protected the derivatively liable third parties because no dis-
pute existed as to whether they would be entitled to indemnification by Robins, thereby
diminishing the estate.
That there are thousands of Dalkon Shield actions and claims pending is a fact
established in the record and the limited fund available under Robins's insur-
ance policy is recognized in the record. It seems incontestable that, if the suits
are permitted to continue and discovery allowed, any effort at reorganization of
the debtor will be frustrated, if not permanently thwarted. It is obvious from
the record that if suits are permitted to proceed against indemnitees on the
claims on which the indemnitees are entitled to indemnity by Robins, either a
binding judgment against the debtor will result or, as the court in Metal
Center said, inconsistent judgments will result, calling for the exercise of the
court's equitable powers.
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Consequently, the Robins court stayed the litigation against
these solvent codefendants under section 362.00
Following the spirit of Robins, courts that chose to construe
section 362 broadly looked only for the presence of an indemnifi-
cation agreement to measure whether third party litigation
would result in any impact on the debtor.0 1 Lomas Financial v.
Northern Trust 2 typifies this approach. Lomas involved a mo-
tion to enjoin a fraud action commenced by an unsecured credi-
tor against two Lomas executives.6 3 The issue before the court
Id. at 1008.
eo The Robins court found that the claimants were trying to circumvent the section
362 stay by bringing an action against officers of the debtor and stated that "congres-
sional intent to provide relief to debtors would be frustrated by permitting indirectly
what is expressly prohibited in the Code." Id. at 999. In staying actions against Aetna as
the liability insurer, the court reasoned that A.11 Robins would have to pay directly if
the insurance policy limits were exceeded, and held that the insurance policy is property
of the estate and therefore protected under section 362(a)(3). Id. at 1001-02. Section
362(a)(3) stays "any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).
In light of the number of product liability suits that had been filed (the court esti-
mated that 5000 injury suits had been filed as of the time of the filing of the bankruptcy
petition), the insurance policy was clearly "the most important asset of the debtor's es-
tate." Robins, 788 F.2d at 1001 (citing In re Johns-Manville Corp., 40 B.R. 219, 229
(S.D.N.Y. 1984)). The court further recognized the inequitable result to a majority of the
injured plaintiffs if only a few plaintiffs were awarded insurance policy proceeds in pref-
erence to other injured plaintiffs. This would occur if plaintiffs were allowed to proceed
against the insurance company and collect on the policy on a first come, first serve basis.
Robins, 788 F.2d at 1001.
The court 'found that the actions against the solvent third parties were essentially
actions against the estate because "there is such an identity between the debtor and the
third party defendant that the debtor may be said to be the real party defendant...."
Id. at 999. Consequently, the court granted them the protection of the section 362 stay
without requiring that they fie personal petitions. In arriving at the conclusion that the
stay should be extended to the insurance policy and to solvent officers, the court focused
on the "unusual circumstances" present in the case. Id. at 999-1001.
61 See, e.g., Hillsborough Holding Corp. v. Celotex Corp. (In re Hilisborough), 123
B.R. 1004 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (stay extended to officers due to existence of indemnification
agreement); Circle K Corp. v. Marks (In re Circle K), 121 B.R. 257 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1990) (stay extended to officers due to existence of indemnification and insurance policy
agreement).
'2 No. 89-6602A (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1990), aT'd, 117 B.R. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1990),
remanded, 932 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1991).
63 The facts of Lomas are as follows: In March, 1988 The Northern Trust Co.
("Northern") executed an agreement with Lomas Financial Corp. ("Lomas") which pro-
vided that Northern would lend Lomas $20 million upon receiving a representation that
Lomas' net worth was at least $500 million at the time of the loan request and would not
drop below that amount during the duration of the loan. See Defendants-Appellants
Brief at 4 n.2, Lomas Fin. Corp. v. Northern Trust Co. (In re Lomas Fin. Corp.), 932
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was whether Northern's suit was "a poorly disguised effort to
end run the automatic stay. '64 Northern argued that the officers
were individually liable for damages resulting from Northern's
reliance on the officers' misrepresentation. 5 The court ruled in
favor of the debtor, extending the automatic stay and a section
105 injunction, due to the risk of cost to the estate as a result of
the officers' indemnification agreements. The court never consid-
ered the merits of Northern's fraud claim or the likelihood that
F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 90-5059).
The two officers charged with fraudulent misrepresentation were Byerley, the Vice
President-Finance and Treasurer of Lomas and Hall, an Assistant Treasurer. Id. at 3. In
June, 1989 Byerley and Hall misrepresented the financial condition of Lomas to North-
ern in order to trigger Northern's obligation to advance $20 million under the loan agree-
ment. Northern relied on the misrepresentation that was made both orally and in writing
and advanced the funds to Lomas on June 26, 1989. Id. at 3-4.
Only three days after the funds were transferred, Lomas announced that its actual
net worth was only $263 million, despite the terms of the agreement with Northern re-
quiring it to maintain a net worth above $500 million. In September, 1989, only 90 days
after Northern made the loan to Lomas, Lomas filed for bankruptcy protection under
Chapter 11. Id. at 4.
Northern then instituted a state court action (Northern filed a complaint in the
district court for the Northern District of Texas, Northern Trust Co. v. Byerley, No.
CA3-89-3055-G (N.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 1989)) charging that the two officers of the debtor
made negligent or fraudulent misrepresentations concerning Lomas's financial condition
and that the bank relied to its detriment on these representations and thus was entitled
to recover damages in the amount of the loss on the loan. Id. at 3-4. Lomas then applied
to the bankruptcy court for an order under section 362 or, alternatively, under section
105, to extend injunctive protection to the solvent defendants of the Northern suit. See
Defendants-Appellants Brief at 5, Lomas Fin. Corp. v. Northern Trust Co. (In re Lomas
Fin. Corp.), 932 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 90-5059).
See Lomas slip op. at 7.
65 See Northern's Complaint at 6, Northern Trust Co. v. Byerley, No. 89-6602A
(N.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 1989). A right of indemnification arises only for suits resulting from
corporate conduct. See N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 721 (McKinney 1992) (nonexclusivity sec-
tion prohibits indemnification for deliberately dishonest acts, even if the corporation
benefitted, as in the Lomas case).
If an officer is derivatively liable on the claim with the corporation, the conduct had
to be corporate in nature and consequently the officer would be eligible for indemnifica-
tion from the corporation. Therefore, the action will have the effect of diminishing estate
assets and risking the reorganization. Where an officer is independently liable on the
creditor's claim, the conduct could not have been corporate in nature and any right to
indemnification may be barred due to conduct limitations in the indemnification agree-
ment. See infra note 151.
Another device to stay an action against officers of a debtor corporation is a determi-
nation that the debtor is an indispensable party to the creditor's suit against the officer.
The court in In re Related Asbestos Cases, 23 B.R. 523 (N.D. Cal. 1982), addressed this
issue, holding "[loint tortfeasors are not considered indispensable parties under federal
law." Id. at 530 (citing Field v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 626 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1980)).
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Lomas would complete a successful reorganization. 6 Indeed, the
court held that the mere existence of a Director and Officer
("D&O") insurance policy, even one which limited Lomas's lia-
bility to $10,000, was sufficient to extend the stay.67 The court
rested on the possibility that if the insurance policy proceeds
were consumed by litigation, the debtor might be forced to in-
demnify the officers.6"
Lomas Fin. Corp. v. Northern Trust Co. (In re Lomas), No. 89-6602A, slip op. at
9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1990). For a Chapter 11 business reorganization to be suc-
cessful, creditors must have confidence in the debtor's executives and their ability to run
the company. The majority of a creditor's claim is usually paid over time, after the con-
firmation of the plan. If a creditor who holds a large claim, like Northern in Lomas, loses
confidence in the ability of the executives to reorganize successfully, it may be difficult to
negotiate the terms of a plan, as the creditor will doubt the ability of the debtor to pay
the claim over time.
If the creditors' committee loses confidence in the ability of the executives to reor-
ganize, the court can, upon a motion, appoint a trustee. Section 1104(a) provides that:
At any time after the commencement of the case but before confirmation of a
plan, on request of a party in interest or the United States trustee, and after
notice and a hearing, the court shall order the appointment of a trustee-
(1) for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mis-
management of the affairs of the debtor by current management, either
before or after the commencement of the case, or similar cause, but not
including the number of holders of securities of the debtor or the
amount of assets or liabilities of the debtor, or
(2) if such appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity secur-
ity holders, and other interests of the estate, without regard to the num-
ber of holders of securities of the debtor or the amount of assets or lia-
bilities of the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1983). This section grants the court the authority to appoint a trus-
tee in a chapter 11 case where the current management has been fraudulent or dishonest
in managing the business.
Lomas slip op. at 5. Lomas's D & 0 policy had a deductible of $10,000. The court
failed to account for the minimal effect a $10,000 judgment would have upon the reor-
ganization when the estate had liabilities in excess of $500 million. Id.
" Lomas, slip op. at 9. Since a debtor corporation is precluded from accessing insur-
ance proceeds to pay unsecured creditors, one could argue that an action against an indi-
vidually liable officer would have the effect of reducing a claim against the estate by the
amount recovered by the creditor from the insurance policy. For example, in Lomas, if
Northern had been able to recover the full amount of its loan ($20 million) from the two
officers, the result would have been a reduction in the amount of unsecured claims
against the assets of Lomas equal to the amount Northern recovered from the insurance
policy. In cases where an officer is derivatively liable, this would be inequitable to the
other unsecured creditors, allowing a similarly situated creditor to recover the full
amount of its claim, potentially from the D & 0 insurance. If, however, the officer is
individually liable on the creditor's claim, the result would not be inequitable to the rest
of the creditors since this particular creditor suffered an injury that would not serve to




The Lomas rationale has been used by other courts to ex-
tend the stay when an indemnification agreement exists. One
particularly egregious example is In re Vitarine.69 There the
stay was extended to protect the debtor's president from a suit
brought by preferred stockholders and other officers of the
debtor corporation for securities fraud, common law fraud, civil
RICO, breach of contract, breach of warranty and negligent mis-
representation."0 At the hearing, Vitarine's president presented
evidence showing that an indemnification agreement existed be-
tween himself and the debtor corporation.7 1 The court refused to
hear any evidence to support the merits of the plaintiffs' action
against the president. Nor did it seek any evidence to support
the notion that Vitarine would complete a successful reorganiza-
tion. Instead, the court, in an analysis similar to that in Robins
and Lomas, focused on the risk that the litigation might exhaust
the officer liability insurance policies and that subsequent judg-
ments would have to be paid out of the estate.
B. The Narrow Approach: Section 362
The myopic approach that extends automatic stay protec-
tion whenever an officer indemnification agreement exists, with-
out determining the actual harm to the estate or the possible
inequity that would result if the stay were to issue, has been
rejected by a number of courts. 3 These courts have engaged in
"' Bondy v. Jordan (In re Vitarine), No. 91 B 12392 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Judge Lifland,
Sept. 19, 1991) Hearing Transcript at 10.
70 Complaint at 11-17, Bondy v. Vitarine Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (CV-91-1631)
(E.D.N.Y. May 3, 1991). The complaint alleged that Roger Jordan, president of Vitarine
Pharmaceutical, fraudulently induced the plaintiffs to sell their respective pharmaceuti-
cal companies to Vitarine in exchange for cash and preferred stock. The inducement
Jordan allegedly made to the plaintiffs was that Vitarine had obtained Federal Drug
Administration ("FDA") approval to produce a number of generic drugs and once that
was underway, the preferred stock would be worth much more than its current $12 per
share. In reality, the complaint alleged, Jordan had sent recoated name brand drugs to
the FDA as Vitarine's generics. This position was supported by affidavits of laboratory
technicians who personally substituted the name brand drugs for the FDA samples. On
October 3, 1989, the FDA learned of the false filings and withdrew approval of the distri-
bution application. Shortly thereafter the value of Vitarine stock plummeted, plaintiffs
instituted this action and Vitarine filed for protection under chapter 11 of the bank-
ruptcy code. Id. at 8-10.
7'1 Hearing Transcript at 34-35, In re Vitarine, (No. 91 B 12392) (August 15, 1991).
72 Id. at 64-70.
"' For cases that limit the application of section 362 to the debtor and property of
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strict statutory construction of both the text of section 362 and
its legislative history.7 4 They hold that Congress intended sec-
tion 362 to be limited to the debtor and property of the estate
and that any injunction affecting third parties should be issued
under section 105.71
The classic case enunciating this position is In re Johns-
Manville Corporation.6 Johns-Manville and other manufactur-
ers of asbestos were being sued for injuries resulting from expo-
sure to asbestos.77 In response to these actions, Johns-Manville
filed for chapter 11 and, as a result, Manville was severed from
the tort actions by operation of section 362.78 The codefendants
sought an extension of Manville's bankruptcy stay." The court
denied them an extension under section 362, ruling that the au-
tomatic stay applied to the debtor only.80 The court would have
the estate, see supra note 6.
7' The court in Ripley v. Mulroy, 80 B.R. 17 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), held that the stay did
not protect the sole shareholder of the debtor from a fraud action brought by a pur-
chaser of the debtor's promissory notes. In defining the scope of section 362, the court
stated that "Itihe automatic stay provision was intended by Congress to apply to the
debtor only, and not to others. A 'debtor' under the Bankruptcy Code, is the 'person...
concerning which a case under [the Bankruptcy Code] has been commenced."' Id. at 19
(citations omitted). Here, the sole shareholder was found not to be a debtor, and there-
fore the section 362 stay provision did not apply.
75 The court in Supermercado Gamboa, Inc. v. Camara De Commerciantes Mayoris-
tas De Puerto Rico, Inc. (In re Supermercado Gamboa, Inc.), 68 B.R. 230 (Bankr. D.
P.R. 1986), held that section 362 did not extend to solvent officers and shareholders of
the debtor and that section 105 was the only statutory alternative to section 362. Id. at
233-34.
7 GAF Corp. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (in re Johns-Manville Corp.), 26 B.R. 405
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
77 The court estimated that the Manville codefendants were named in approxi-
mately 11,000 personal injury cases at the time of the bankruptcy case. Id. at 407.
78 Id. at 406.
7 Id. at 408. The codefendants of Manville in personal injury and property damage
cases were: GAF Corporation, Keene Corporation, Armstrong World Industries, Inc.,
ILK. Porter Company, Inc., Pittsburgh Corning Corp., Garlock, Inc., Celotex Corp. and
Fiberboard Corp. Id. These codefendants argued that they would seek contribution from
Manville's estate for any recovery by the tort claimants and that, as a result, Manville
was an indispensable party to the actions. The court held that joint tortfeasors are not
considered indispensable parties. See In re Related Asbestos Cases, 23 B.R. 523 (N.D.
Cal. 1982).
"' Manville, 26 B.R. at 411. The court concluded that "[u]nless specifically called
for in the Code, the automatic stay applies only to the debtor." Id. The court was specifi-
cally referring to the existence of co-debtor protection in chapter 13 and the lack of co-
debtor protection in chapter 11. The Manville court held that the legislative comment
accompanying section 362, (see supra note 26), was controlling. In so doing, it stated
"the legislative history of the statute, the well-settled interpretation of the predecessor
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granted an injunction to these codefendants if they had been
able to show that a lawsuit against them would have caused ir-
reparable harm to Manville or its estate.8 1
Two recent decisions that have adopted the Manville hold-
ing that section 362 does not extend beyond the debtor and its
property are Teachers Ins. & Annuity Association of America v.
Butler82 and In re Crazy Eddie Securities.3 In both of these
actions, the officers of the debtor were being sued by creditors
for damages resulting from fraud."4 The officers sought to have
the actions stayed under section 362.85 This motion was denied
by both courts, holding that section 362 protects only the debtor
and property of the estate.' The Crazy Eddie court did not ad-
dress the issue of whether the action may be stayed under sec-
tion 105. The Second Circuit in Teachers ruled that a stay may
issue under section 105, providing the officers could show that
their actions were free from fraud." The officers were unable to
do so and thus the fraud action was allowed to proceed.88
Act by cases and commentary and the clear language of Section 362 makes it quite clear
that, in chapter 11, the protections afforded the bankrupt are designed for the debtor-
bankrupt only." Id. at 410-11, quoting Royal Trucks & Trailer v. Armadora Meritina
Salvadorenna, 10 B.R. 488, 490 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
81 The Manville codefendants argued that the actions represented similar issues of
law and fact (i.e., all of the suits were for personal injury damages stemming from expo-
sure to asbestos of which Manville was the largest producer). Since the threshold issue of
asbestos causation was the same in all the suits, they should not proceed without
Manville. The Manville court refused to extend the stay to solvent codefendants of
Manville because the actions would not adversely impact the debtor, stating that "in the
instant case no such inextricable intertwining has been proven as to each and every indi-
vidual case by the codefendants. This is because the only relationship demonstrated be-
tween the codefendants is that of joint tortfeasor." Manville, 26 B.R. at 413.
82 803 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1986).
83 104 B.R. 582 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
84 Teachers, 803 F.2d at 62; Crazy Eddie, 104 B.R. at 583.
85 See Teachers, 803 F.2d at 65; Crazy Eddie, 104 B.R. at 583.
88 The Teachers court stated that "[i]t is well-established that stays pursuant to
section 362(a) are limited to debtors and do not encompass non-bankrupt co-defend-
ants." 803 F.2d at 65. The court in Crazy Eddie cited Teachers for the same proposition.
104 B.R. at 583.
87 The court held that section 105 would not extend to the solvent partners:
While we decline to define under what circumstances, if any, a bankruptcy
court may properly exercise § 105 jurisdiction to issue a stay with respect to
non-bankrupt co-defendants, it is clear that any such jurisdiction cannot ex-
tend to efforts made in bad faith by non-bankrupt co-defendants in order to
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C. The Use of Section 105 to Enjoin Third Party Actions
A court that is unwilling to extend protection to third par-
ties under section 362 may be persuaded to extend the protec-
tion under section 105. As the legislative intent makes clear,
Congress was not so hubristic as to assume that it could antici-
pate all circumstances where an injunction should issue and en-
acted section 105 to address these situations. 89 Courts are split,
however, on what section 105 standard is required before the is-
suance of an injunction. 0 Some focus on the legislative comment
to section 362 which demands that Rule 65 be met before grant-
ing a section 105 injunction."" Others require no demonstration
of irreparable harm before issuing a section 105 injunction. 2
This Note would adopt a Rule 65 standard before the issuance
of a section 105 injunction.
1. The Minimal Showing for Section 105 Relief
In recent years courts have tended to allow section 105 in-
junctions to issue without requiring the movant to make a show-
" For legislative comment of section 362 see infra text accompanying note 26.
90 Compare Garrity v. Leffler (In re Neuman), 71 B.R. 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (no ir-
reparable harm showing required for a section 105 injunction); Lomas Fin. Corp. v.
Northern Trust Co., Docket No. 89-6602A (Jan. 11, 1990) (section 105 injunction can
issue if court is satisfied that such a proceeding would impair its jurisdiction) with Uni-
versity Medical Ctr. v. American Sterilizer Co. (In re University Medical Ctr.), 82 B.R.
754 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (section 105 injunction can issue only after a four-prong Rule
65 standard is met); TRS Inc. v. Peterson Grain & Brokerage Co. (In re TRS, Inc.), 76
B.R. 805 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987) (section 105 injunction requires a heavy burden, sup-
ported by substantial evidence, and every factor of a strict Rule 65 standard must be
met).
91 The court in In re Arrow Huss, 51 B.R. 853 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985), requiring the
movant to meet a heavy Rule 65 burden before the issuance of a section 105 injunction,
stated:
Clearly, something more than the mere fact that one codefendant has filed a
Chapter 11 petition must be shown in order to warrant a stay of proceedings
against a nondebtor codefendant. If the litigation against the nondebtor merely
has an indirect or insignificant effect on the reorganization, a stay is likewise
unwarranted. The power to prevent creditors from proceeding against non-
debtors must only be used in extraordinary cases, and not simply to "assist"
the debtor in reorganizing or to relieve general "pressure" on the debtor.
Id. at 858 (citations omitted).
02 For cases that require no showing of irreparable harm before a section 105 injunc-
tion, see Garrity v. Leffler (In re Neuman), 71 B.R. 567 (S.D.N.Y. 198?); Lomas Fin.
Corp. v. Northern Trust Co. (In re Lomas Fin. Corp.), 117 B.R. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); LTV
Steel Co. v. Board of Educ. (In re Chateaugay), 93 B.R. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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ing of irreparable harm."' Courts that have adopted this ap-
proach argue that because injunctions under section 105 are
authorized by statute, no irreparable harm threshold has to be
met.9 4 Instead, they reason that the text of section 105 requires
merely that courts be "satisfied that such a proceeding would
defeat or impair its jurisdiction with respect to a case before
it.""s In short, they rely on the absence of any standard within
the text of section 105 to permit injunctions to issue on what
amounts to an arbitrary basis.96
A low section 105 threshold was first developed in In re
Neuman.9 7 In Neuman the court granted an injunction prevent-
ing the transfer of a certificate of operation, the final step in the
sale of a nursing home.98 At issue was whether the certificate was
93 See Garrity v. Leffler (In re Neuman), 71 B.R. 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). An injunction
issued against a party seeking to obtain property in which the debtor's rights had ex-
pired. The Neuman court stated that "[s]ince injunctions in bankruptcy cases are au-
thorized by statute, the usual equitable grounds for relief, such as irreparable damage,
need not be shown." Id. at 571. For a comprehensive look at New York State's degrada-
tion of the traditional standards for injunctive relief, see David Frey, Note, The Yellow-
stone Injunction, or "How to Vex Your Landlord Without Really Trying," 58 BnOOK. L.
REv. 155 (1992).
94 Holding that a section 105 injunction requires no irreparable harm showing, the
Neuman court relied on legislative intent stating, "[s]ection 105(a) contemplates injunc-
tive relief in 'precisely those instances where parties are attempting to obstruct the reor-
ganization.'" 71 B.R. at 571-72 (citation omitted) (quoting In re Johns-Manville Corp.,
91 B.R. 225, 228 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
95 Lomas Fin. Corp. v. Northern Trust Co., No. 89-6602A, slip op. at 15 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1990) (quoting In re Johns-Manville Corp., 91 B.R. 225, 228 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
96 The standard employed by these courts gives a great deal of discretion to the
bankruptcy judge to determine whether a third party action will have any impact on the
reorganization. The standard of whether an act "will defeat or impair" the court's juris-
diction is too vague and overbroad to provide any guidance to creditors considering
whether they have a cause of action against a third party. For an example of how this
rationale can be slippery see Lomas, slip. op. at 15.
:7 71 B.R. 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
8 In 1984 Carl Neuman, the owner of a nursing home, entered into an agreement
with Edward Leffier's to transfer title of the home to Leffler. This contract was contin-
gent upon Leffier's obtaining a new operating certificate within two years. Shortly after
the contract was signed, Neuman filed for chapter 11. For nearly two years Leffiler oper-
ated the home on a full time basis as the owner. Before the certificate could be formally
passed to Leffler, the trustee obtained an injunction preventing the transfer and declared
the certificate property of the estate. At the time, New York State law was unclear as to
whether the certificate was property of the estate or merely a licensing right granted by
the state. The injunction prevented Leffler from completing the contract and thus the
trustee was able to reclaim the entire home which had been all but transferred almost
two years before. Neuman appealed this decision arguing that the bankruptcy court had
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a license and thus without value to the estate, or a property in-
terest and thus a part of the estate.99 The District Court, on ap-
peal, held that the court need not reach the issue of whether the
certificate was part of the estate.100 All the trustee needed to
show was that its transfer might fall within the jurisdiction of
the Bankruptcy Code."' Thus the court, without a showing of
harm to the estate, without proof of a successful reorganization
and without regard to the assignee's interest in owning the nurs-
ing home he contracted for and had operated previously, en-
joined the action. 02
The result in Neuman was inequitable because the court ef-
fectively stripped the debtor and the assignee of the right to
bring an action to determine the status of the operating certifi-
cate without requiring the trustee to show a risk of irreparable
harm to the estate. The Neuman standard only requires the
bankruptcy court to determine that the action in question would
defeat or. impair its jurisdiction.10 3
The Neuman approach has been adopted by a number of
courts.' In Lomas the court extended a section 105 injunction
exceeded its jurisdiction in interpreting New York Public Health Law and that the trus-
tee failed to show the irreparable harm in letting the certificate pass to Leffler since the
home had effectively already been passed. The district court rejected this argument,
holding that while the law was unclear concerning the property rights of a certificate of
operation, it was within the power of the bankruptcy court to make this determination.
Moreover, the court concluded that even if the certificate were not a property right and
hence not part of the debtor's estate, it still had the power to enjoin the transfer under
section 105 merely because such transfer may constitute an infringement upon the juris-
diction of the bankruptcy court. Thus, the court required no showing of hardship or
irreparable harm, nor did it require any showing of success on the merits. Id. at 568.
Id. at 570.
100 Id. at 571.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 574.
103 The Neuman court defined impairment of its jurisdiction as the risk that a con-
trary outcome (contrary to the Trustee) of the state court proceeding would throw the
Trustee's operation of the home "into disarray, even if only temporarily." Id. at 572.
Thus, the court issued a section 105 order enjoining a third party state court action to
avoid a temporary inconvenience to the court. Certainly the bankruptcy court has a
strong interest in determining what constitutes property of the estate. In a case such as
this, if the interest of the debtor was that critical, a Rule 65 standard could be met.
104 In the case of LTV Steel Co. v. Cleveland Board of Educ. (In re Chateaugay
Corp.), 93 B.R. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), the court held that the bankruptcy court had the
power to enjoin a state court action brought by a school board seeking po3t-petition
payment of property taxes without requiring the debtor to show irreparable harm to the
reorganization. Since the debt arose post-petition, the debtor was not protected under
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to solvent officers who allegedly defrauded creditors into lending
the debtor $20 million. 105 The Lomas court did not require the
debtor corporation to demonstrate that irreparable harm would
ensue if the action against the officers were allowed to pro-
ceed.10 6 Nor did the court explain how the balance of equities
favored allowing the solvent, allegedly fraudulent officers to en-
joy bankruptcy protection, while denying the creditor's pleas for
relief. In the same vein, the court did not require the debtor to
show that it had a substantial chance of successfully reorganiz-
ing. Last, the court did not address the public policy concerns of
allowing executives to use the sanctuary of bankruptcy after al-
legedly defrauding creditors. °7 In short, the court required a
standard substantially lower than the Rule 65 standard.
2. The Narrow Approach to Section 105 Injunctive Relief
Courts that adopt the narrow approach to section 105 re-
quire that a traditional rule 65 standard be met before the issu-
ance of a section 105 injunction. 08 These courts require the mo-
section 362. However, the court held that its "broad equitable powers" coupled with the
burden that payment of the tax would have conflicting results, the debtor did not have
to show irreparable harm to enjoin the state court action. Id. at 29. See also Lomas Fin.
Corp. v. Northern Trust Co. (In re Lomas Fin. Corp.), 117 B.R. 64, 66 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) ("The force of the irreparable harm requirement must be considered in light of
recent language by the Bankruptcy Court in this district", citing In re Neuman); Eastern
Air Lines v. Rolleston (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 111 B.R. 423, 431 (Bankr. S.D,N.Y.
1990) ("Since injunctions in bankruptcy cases are authorized by statute, the usual equi-
table grounds for relief need not be shown.").
105 For a discussion of the facts of Lomas, see supra notes 62-68 and accompanying
text.
Jo Lomas, slip op. at 15-16.
107 The court in University Medical Ctr. v. American Sterilizer Co. (In re University
Medical Ctr.), 82 B.R. 754 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988), described the public policy considera-
tion in bankruptcy as "requir[ing] a balancing of the public interest in successful bank-
ruptcy reorganizations with other competing societal interests." Id. at 757.
108 In holding that section 105 requires a Rule 65 showing, the Manville court
stated:
Bankruptcy Rule 7065 generally incorporates Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure so that it is necessary to comply with Federal Rule 65 when
seeking injunctive relief.... While the power may be broad under Section 105,
the courts should be careful not to abuse it. Section 105 is not without limits.
It does not permit the court to ignore, supersede, suspend or even misconstrue
the statute itself or the rules. The bankruptcy courts should exercise great care
in this regard.
Manville, 26 B.R. at 415 (citing 2 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY, supra note 17, 1 105.02). The
court in In re Trails End Lodge, Inc. 45 B.R. 597 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984) denied a section
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vant to demonstrate that: (1) the debtor will suffer irreparable
harm if the injunction does not issue; (2) there is a likelihood
that the reorganization will be successful; (3) the balance of eq-
uities tips decidedly in favor of the movant, and; 4) an injunc-
tion would not violate public policy.109 In a majority of suits
against corporate officers of debtor corporations this burden can
be met. 10 However, where the officers have committed acts of
fraud, or are otherwise independently liable to the creditor, and
where a Rule 65 standard cannot be met, an injunction should
not issue.
The counterintuitive result in Lomas is avoided when the
courts require the movant to meet a Rule 65 standard before
issuing an injunction. In re University Medical Center*1 in-
volved a debtor medical partnership that had a large number of
medical malpractice suits pending. The injured plaintiffs sought
to bring their claims against the individual physicians who had
not filed for bankruptcy. The physicians moved to enjoin this
action under sections 362 and 105.112 The court held that section
362 protects only debtors and property of the estate. It refused
to extend injunctive relief to the doctors under section 105 be-
cause they failed to meet the four-pronged Rule 65 test. 21 1 This
105 stay to officers and stockholders who had guaranteed the debtor's promissory notes.
When creditors sought to recover against the solvent guarantor-officers, they moved to
enjoin recovery under section 105. The court denied the protection, stating:
In effect the movants would have the bankruptcy court hold [the creditors] at
bay, suspended in mid-air, while they sit coyly by awaiting manna from heaven
in the eternal hope that it will solve their self-created financial difficulties. In
sum, they are requesting this court to endow them with newly created rights.
Even though section 105 does grant to the bankruptcy court broad powers to
"issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary to carry out the provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Code" it does not empower this court to fashion sub-
stantive rights out of thin air.
Id. at 603.
109 For cases that require a Rule 65 showing prior to issuing a section 105 injunction,
see supra note 34.
110 In the majority of cases corporate officers are derivatively liable on the creditors
claims. For the officer to be independently liable, the officer must have acted either in an
individual capacity or outside the scope of employment, e.g., as in fraud. The ManLille
court pointed out that where an officer is derivatively liable, the creditor is pursuing an
identical, inextricably interwoven claim against the officer as it could against the debtor.
Manville, 26 B.R. at 418.
1 University Medical Ctr. v. American Sterilizer Co. (In re University Medical
Ctr.), 82 B.R. 754, 755 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
122 Id.
n1 Id. at 756 (citing Delaware River Port Auth. v. Transamerican Trailer Tronsp.,
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result is equitable.114 The injured patients need to be compen-
sated for their additional medical bills and for their suffering. 10
They were not pursuing their claims against the debtor partner-
ship, but against solvent physicians who were individually liable
on their claims and had malpractice insurance sufficient to cover
any claims against them.l""
There are instances where it is proper for the court to issue
an injunction to bar an action against an officer who is indepen-
dently liable. One such example is In re TRS,1 7 in which a cred-
itor was enjoined from executing a default judgment against the
president and sole managing officer of a debtor corporation.1 8
The president was able to show that his time was nearly 100
percent occupied with the reorganization efforts of the debtor
and that the suit would detract from that function.1 ' He further
argued that a judgment entered against him would lead to per-
sonal bankruptcy, resulting in the loss of his substantial stock
interest in the debtor, thereby rendering any further efforts on
his part to reorganize the debtor fruitless.1 20 Thus, the court
found that an action against the officer would substantially and
irreparably harm the reorganization.121
Inc., 501 F.2d 917, 919-20 (3d Cir. 1974)).
114 The result in this case is equitable for the following reasons:
1. The court inquired whether the physicians were contributing any money to
help fund the reorganization. The physicians stated they would, but only as a
last effort.
2. The court inquired whether the medical malpractice insurance proceeds
would be sufficient to cover the costs of litigation. The physicians indicated the
policy limits would probably not be exceeded by the present actions.
3. The court inquired whether the physicians would spend time on the litiga-
tion as opposed to the reorganization. The physicians indicated that the mal-
practice actions would take no longer than a couple of hours.
In re University Medical Ctr., 82 B.R. at 756. Clearly the court investigated any risk of
irreparable harm, found none and denied the injunctive protection sought.
I'D Id. at 755.
I' The physicians admitted to having $150,000 of medical insurance each. Id. at
756.
"., 76 B.R. 805 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987).




'21 Holding that the injunction in this case did not violate public policy, the court
stated, "[t]he public interest is clearly served by reorganizing chapter 11 debtors when-
ever possible. A reorganization case should not be summarily torpedoed by the actions of
a single unsecured creditor who just happens to have a guaranty of the debtor's principal
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Corporate Executive Protection under the Automatic Stay
The extension of section 362 to protect solvent third parties
is incorrect for a number of reasons. It is contrary to the plain
meaning and legislative history of the automatic stay. 22 Under a
section 362 analysis, a court is under no obligation to address
the interests of the party being stayed and as a result, it does
not account for the equities involved in the proceeding. Ex-
tending section 362 to protect solvent executives focuses purely
on the relationship between the officer and the debtor:' 23 if there
is a contractual relationship between the two, the court will ex-
tend the stay. But the impact of a third party suit is often so
attenuated that it really has no impact at all.' 24 On the other
hand, limiting section 362 to actions against the debtor and
property of the estate and requiring the debtor under section
105 to satisfy a Rule 65 standard 25 forces the court to evaluate
both the likelihood that the debtor will be harmed and level of
harm the debtor may face, and the possible harm to other
creditors. 26
1. Section 362: Strict Statutory Interpretation
The text of section 362 limits stay protection to the debtor
and property of the estate. Confining the scope of section 362 in
this manner is consistent with the plain meaning and legislative
history of the statute. 27 Congress acknowledged the limited
shareholder and managing officer." Id. at 809.
122 The text of section 362 refers exclusively to the debtor and property of the es-
tate. For the text of section 362, see supra note 2. For a discussion of the leGislative
intent of section 362, see infra notes 126-36 and accompanying text.
123 For a discussion on the focus of a section 362 extension to solvent third parties,
see infra notes 153-63 and accompanying text.
124 For a discussion of derivative and independent liability, see infra notes 143-63
and accompanying text.
125 For a discussion of this standard, see infra notes 175-84 and accompanying text.
12 For a discussion of extending protection to solvent third parties under section
362 simply on the basis of the existence of an indemnification agreement, see infra notes
137-63 and accompanying text.
12 The Manville court stated: "The language of Section 362 clearly refers only to
actions against the debtor and does not relate to any other interparty .. .. A
literal interpretation of this language comports with the rationale behind the formulation
of an automatic stay in this statutory scheme... ." GAF Corp. v. Johns-Manville Corp.
(In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 26 B.R. 405, 409 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983). See also Leslie
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scope of section 362 in its legislative comment and provided an
alternative for debtors who seek injunctive relief from those ac-
tions not covered by the automatic stay:
The court has ample other powers to stay actions not covered by the
automatic stay. Section 105, of proposed title 11, derived from Bank-
ruptcy Act section 2a(15), grants the power to issue orders necessary
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of title 11 .... Stays or
injunctions issued under these other sections will not be automatic
upon the commencement of the case, but will be granted or issued
under the usual rules for the issuance of injunctions.12 8
When Congress limited section 362 to actions against the
debtor and property of the estate it achieved two goals. First, it
insured that the automatic trigger 129 of section 362 would be
limited to acts that Congress already determined would result in
irreparable harm to the debtor.130 Second, recognizing it could
M. Summerford, Note, Bankruptcy: Creditor's Alter Ego Action Against Parent Corpo-
ration Was Deemed Property of Debtor's Estate To Which The Automatic Stay Ap-
plied: S.I. Acquisition, Inc. v. Eastway Delivery Service, Inc. (In re S.I. Acquisition), 817
F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1987), 19 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1213 (1988). For a comprehensive discus-
sion of alter-ego liability in bankruptcy see Mark L. Prager & Jonathan A. Backman,
Pursuing Alter-Ego Liability Against Non-Bankrupt Third Parties: Structuring a Com-
prehensive Conceptual Framework, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 657 (1991).
128 BANKRUPTCY LAW REVIsIoN: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP.
No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5837; H.R.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 342 (9177), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6298
(emphasis added).
129 The automatic aspect of section 362 results in an instantaneous ex parte injunc-
tion upon filing against any creditor seeking to recover on a claim or perfect a security
interest on property of the estate. For the text of section 362, see supra note 2.
130 The legislative comment for section 362 states the purpose behind preventing the
conduct outlined in section 362(a):
The purpose of this provision is to prevent dismemberment of the estate. Liq-
uidation must proceed in an orderly fashion. Any distribution of property must
be by the trustee after he has had an opportunity to familiarize himself with
the various rights and interests involved and with the property available for
distribution.
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-51 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 340-2 (1977). The purpose for the stay is almost identical in a chapter 11 business
reorganization as it is in a chapter 7 liquidation. The trustee in a business reorganization,
or more likely the debtor in possession, see 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1992), must have complete
control over property of the estate to determine the creditors' rights and file a feasible
plan of reorganization in accordance with 11 U.S.C. section 1121.
The court in Minoco Group of Co.'s, Ltd. v. First State Underwriters Agency of New
England Reinsurance Corp. (In re Minoco Group, Ltd.), 799 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1986),
held that regardless of a showing of irreparable harm, the automatic stay goes into effect.
This supports the argument that Congress had already deemed that the actions in sec-
tion 362(a) met the injunctive requirement of irreparable harm.
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not anticipate all actions that could potentially harm the debtor,
Congress included section 105 as the catchall provision, allowing
courts to determine on a case-by-case basis what actions could
harm the reorganization. 31 In addition, Congress required a
threshold showing before courts could enjoin actions not covered
by the automatic stay: "the usual rules for the issuance of in-
junctions," namely the Rule 65 standard. "3 2
The existence of co-debtor protection in other chapters of
the Code and its absence from chapter 11 and section 362 sup-
ports the view that section 362 was intended to protect debtors
and property of the estate exclusively. Chapters 12 and 13 of the
Bankruptcy Code explicitly extend protection to certain co-
debtors, specifically co-debtors on consumer loans. 33 This co-
'31 For a discussion of the legislative comment to section 105, see supra note 31.
'= See KING ETr AL., 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 17, tt 105.02, at 105-5-15.
Collier analogizes a section 105 injunction to a preliminary injunction, stating that
"[b]ecause a request for an injunction pursuant to section 105 is akin to a request for a
preliminary injunction, the party seeking injunctive relief must satisfy the requirements
of Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as applied to bankruptcy by Bank-
ruptcy Rule 7065." Id. S 105.02, at 105-8. See also In re Trails End Lodge, In., 45 B.R.
597 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984) (section 105 standard should be the same as that for prelimi-
nary injunctions).
11 See 11 U.S.C. § 1201 (1992); 11 U.S.C. § 1301 (1992). This extension is limited to
those who are jointly liable on consumer debts. The reason for this protection is that
most consumer debts occur within the context of a family, where a husband, wife or
other family member will co-sign for an extension of credit. As a result, the extension of
protection to third parties in this context is logical since many consumer loans are co-
signed by a family member and are not arms-length transactions. The protection af-
forded co-debtors in chapters 12 and 13 is not all encompassing since a chapter 12 or 13
debtor will not exclusively have consumer debts. A consumer debt is defined by Bank-
ruptcy Code section 101(7) as a debt incurred by an individual primarily for personal,
family or household purposes. A family farm corporation, engaged in the business of
farming, while eligible to use chapter 12, could not obtain a co-debtor stay of actions on
the personal guarantees of the shareholders because a corporate debt could not be a
consumer debt. For a more comprehensive discussion of chapter 12 and 13 co-debtor
stays, see AARON, supra note 3, at § 5.01(3).
Section 1301(a) provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, after the order
for relief under this chapter, a creditor may not act, or commence or continue
any civil action, to collect all or any part of a consumer debt of the debtor from
any individual that is liable on such debt with the debtor, or that secured
such debt, unless-
(1) such individual became liable on or secured such debt in the ordi-
nary course of such individual's business; or
(2) the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7
or 11 of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (1979) (emphasis added).
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debtor protection is absent from the text of chapter 11 and sec-
tion 362.134 Under the ordinary rules of statutory construction,
the inclusion of co-debtor stay protection under chapters 12 and
13 and the exclusion of any protection under chapter 11 suggest
that Congress intended to exclude stay protection to co-parties
in chapter 11.135 Consequently a number of circuits have held
that the section 362 stay only applies to debtors and not to sol-
vent co-parties.136 To protect solvent third parties as well as
debtors and the reorganization itself, Congress enacted section
105.
2. The Risk of Indemnification to the Reorganization
An action that does not expressly violate the automatic
stay, but can violate its purpose, is one against the solvent of-
ficers of a debtor corporation.137 Although actions against execu-
tives are not explicitly barred by the language of section 362,188
corporate officer indemnification agreements make actions
against officers essentially actions against the debtor.139 Depend-
See supra note 2.
The court in Lynch v. Johns-Manville Corp., 710 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir. 1983), made
this same legislative intent argument, stating that "it is a fundamental rule of statutory
construction that inclusion in one part of a congressional scheme of that which is ex-
cluded in another part reflects a congressional intent that the exclusion was not inadver-
tent." Id. at 1197.
'36 See Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assoc. of America v. Butler, 803 F.2d 61 (2d Cir.
1986) (automatic stay provision does not include solvent partners of debtor); Fortier v.
Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1984) (section 362 was only in-
tended to protect the debtor and property of the estate); Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard
Corp., 706 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1983) (automatic stay does not stay actions against joint
tortfeasors); Lynch v. Johns-Manville (In re Johns-Manville), 710 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir.
1983) (section 362 did not operate to protect solvent codefendants of Manville). Cf. A.H.
Robins Co. v. Piccinin Co. (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1986) (section
362 applies to solvent coparties in "unusual circumstances").
The court in In re Arrow Huss, Inc., 51 B.R. 853 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985), reasoned
"that Congress may have considered the issue of a general stay of actions against guaran-
tors in reorganization cases, but apparently rejected such a blanket stay and limited co-
debtor stays to Chapter 13." Id. at 856.
137 See Lomas Fin. Corp. v. Northern Trust Co. (In re Lomas Fin. Corp.), No. 89-
6602A, (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1990). The Lomas court found that litigation on a pre-
petition cause of action is the type of activity from which section 362 seeks to shield the
debtor. It described Northern's suit as "a transparent attempt.., to end run the auto-
matic stay." Slip op. at 9 (emphasis added). For an expanded discussion of Lomas, see
infra note 155 and accompanying text.
13 For the language of section 362, see supra note 2.
139 The action is essentially one against the debtor, provided the executive either
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ing on the terms of the agreement, potentially all costs and any
judgment against the officer would have to be paid by the corpo-
rate debtor. 140 Consequently, under certain circumstances, if a
creditor's action is allowed to proceed against an executive, the
estate will be diminished and the reorganization may be jeopard-
ized. 141 In A.H. Robins v. Piccinin142 the Fourth Circuit fash-
meets the requirements for indemnification set forth in the state's law of incorporation
or by the terms of a Director and Officer Liability insurance policy. Corporations are
permitted to execute indemnification agreements with officers and directors under provi-
sions in the applicable state's law of incorporation. Thus, when the state of incorporation
prohibits indemnification by the corporation for certain types of conduct, the officer has
no right of indemnification for litigation arising out of that conduct. However, most
states, including Delaware, have nonexclusive laws concerning indemnification and allow
corporations to indemnify executives in circumstances other than those contained in the
statute. See DFL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f) (1991). Delaware General Corporation Law
section 145(a) provides that:
A corporation may indemnify any person who was or is a party or is threatened
to be made a party to any threatened, pending or completed action suit or
proceeding, whether civil, criminal, administrative or investigative (other than
an action by or in the right of the corporation) by reason of the fact that he is
or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the corporation ... against
expenses (including attorney's fees), judgments, fines and amounts paid in set-
tlement actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection with such ac-
tion, suit or proceeding if he acted in good faith and in a manner he reasona-
bly believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation,
and, with respect to any criminal action or proceeding, had no reasonable
cause to believe his conduct was unlawful.
DEIL CODE ANN. tit 8, § 145(a) (1991) (emphasis added).
140 Indemnification agreements generally provide that the corporation will reimburse
the executive for litigation and judgment expenses arising out of conduct in an official
capacity. In response to the virtual explosion of corporate officer and director liability
actions (some due to large corporate bankruptcies), many corporations purchase Director
and Officer Liability Insurance ('D & 0"). Corporations, though often limited by the
conduct requirements of the indemnification provisions in the state laws of incorpora-
tion, are permitted to purchase liability insurance regardless of whether the corporation
would be able to indemnify the officer under state statute. Delaware's D & 0 Insurance
Policy statute provides:
A corporation shall have power to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf
of any person who is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the corpo-
ration, or is or was serving at the request of the corporation as a director, of.
ficer, employee or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture,
trust or other enterprise against any liability asserted against him and incurred
by him in any such capacity, or arising out of his status as such, whether or not
the corporation would have the power to indemnify him against such liability
under the provision of this section.
DEL CODE ANN. tit 8, § 145(g) (1991) (emphasis added).
141 The limiting circumstances that prevent an action against the executive from
diminishing the estate are the limiting clauses in indemnification agreements that only
allow reimbursement for liability on acts that were in good faith and made in the best
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ioned the "unusual circumstances" test to prevent this result.
a. Stay Protection and the Existence of "Unusual
Circumstances"
The holding in Robins, extending protection to executives of
the debtor, was consistent with the purposes of the Code be-
cause the officers were not independently liable to the plain-
tiffs.143 Since the officers were derivatively liable on the claim
against Robins, no dispute existed as to whether they would be
entitled to indemnification for their costs and any potential
judgment. 44 Consequently, if the action against the officers had
been allowed to continue, the plaintiffs would have circum-
vented the stay and done indirectly what they could not do di-
rectly.145 Protecting corporate officers under the circumstances
present in Robins is proper because the officers were not inde-
pendently liable to the plaintiffs and therefore the estate would
incur the cost of the third party litigation.
The Robins court limited extension of the stay, however, to
those situations where the officer is derivatively liable on the
claim: "[If] the third-party defendant was 'independently liable'
as, for example, where the debtor and another are joint
tortfeasors or where the nondebtor's liability rests upon his own
breach of duty, ... the automatic stay would clearly not extend
to such nondebtor.""4 The Robins court distinguished between
corporate officers who are independently liable to plaintiffs, that
interests of the corporation. See infra note 143.
142 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 876 (1986).
"' Id. at 996. For the purposes of this Note, independent liability is defined as any
situation where an officer would otherwise be individually liable for damages arising from
his or her own conduct.
144 Id. at 999. The officers of A.H. Robins were being sued as a consequence of their
positions as officers and not as a result of any individual breach of duty. As a result, they
would be entitled to indemnification from the debtor. Consequently any finding of liabil-
ity against the officers would be a finding against the debtor. Recognizing this inequita-
ble result, the court stated: "'Clearly the debtor's protection must be extended to enjoin
litigation against others if the result would be binding upon the debtor's estate,' and this
is so, whether the debtor is a party or not." Id. at 999 (quoting In re Metal Ctr., Inc., 31
B.R. 458, 462 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983)).
145 In re Metal Ctr., Inc., 31 B.R. at 462 ("Congressional intent to provide relief to
debtors would be frustrated by permitting indirectly what is expressly prohibited in the
Code.").
146 Robins, 788 F.2d at 999 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Metal Ctr., Inc., 31 B.R.
at 462).
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is, those who have breached an individual duty and those who
are perceived liable because of their positions as officers of the
debtor.147 Robins held that officers who are derivatively liable
should be protected because they are automatically entitled to
indemnification. Those who are individually liable should not be
protected. 148 Despite the Robins court holding that the auto-
matic stay would not protect those who are "independently lia-
ble," the automatic stay and the "unusual circumstances" test
have been extended by a number of courts to officers who were
alleged to be individually liable on the creditor's claim.
b. Extending the Stay in Less than "Unusual
Circumstances"
The recent extension of the automatic stay from "unusual
circumstances" to those that are mundane goes against the ex-
plicit language of section 362 and also frustrates its purpose. 40
147 Id.
145 Id. In the case of University Say. Ass'n v. Burnap, 786 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. CL App.
1990), the court addressed precisely the issue of whether an officer could be indemnified
for unlawful conduct that was questionably within the scope of employment. The facts of
the case are as follows: Burnap was a shareholder, officer and director of Austin Savings
Association ("ASA"). He participated in the negotiation of the sale of shares of ASA
common stock to another savings and loan. Seven ASA stockholders who participated in
the sale then sued Burnap, alleging a variety of state and federal securities violations in
his capacity as director. Burnap won each of the suits on motions for summary
judgment.
Burnap then sought indemnification from ASA as provided for in the by.laws which
granted indemnification to any party defendant if "such person is made a party solely by
reason of his being or having been a director, officer or employee of this association." Id.
at 424. The bank denied indemnification, arguing that any allegedly unlawful activity
could not have been in the performance of his duty as a director. If Burnap had been
performing as merely a shareholder, however, he would have had no duty to inform the
other shareholders of his plans and therefore could not be held to breach a duty he did
not have. In determining whether indemnification should be granted, the court framed
the critical issue as whether the claimant would have been named as a defendant if he
were not a director and not whether the claimant was acting within his capacity as a
director. The court compelled indemnification, holding that Burnap was named to the
complaint solely due to his position as a director. See Robert F. Gray, Jr. & Gregory J.
Sergesketter, Corporations, 45 Sw. LJ. 227 (1991).
2" Extending stay protection to officers who are independently liable on the credi-
tor's claim frustrates the automatic stay because the stay refers exclusively to the debtor
and property of the estate. For a discussion of the legislative intent of section 362 see
supra notes 127-37 and accompanying text. This extension further frustrates the pur-
poses of the Code by expanding the holding in Robins to situations where the officer is
liable as a result of his own breach of duty. The Robins court sought to preserve the
equitable goal of section 362 by making the distinction between independently and de-
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Corporate officer indemnification is one factor that enables
courts to infer eventual harm to the debtor from third party liti-
gation.15 0 Harm does not befall the debtor, however, if the exec-
utive's conduct makes her ineligible for indemnification. Execu-
tives who are individually liable on a creditor's claim would
potentially not be eligible for indemnification at all.1"1 If an of-
ficer has no right to receive indemnification, there would be no
impact on the debtor resulting from the creditor's suit. Thus,
depending on the success of the creditors' fraud claim, the of-
ficer may or may not be entitled to indemnification. Despite the
possibility that a debtor might be wholly unaffected, courts have
been willing to utilize the "unusual circumstances" exception
outlined in Robins to extend protection to individually liable
corporate officers. 2
rivatively liable officers. Extension of the Robins rationale to circumstances where an
executive is a joint tortfeasor (as in the case of fraud) with the corporate debtor frus-
trates the equitable underpinnings of the Bankruptcy Code. The Manville court ad-
dressed the issue of protecting joint tortfeasors stating:
That Manville is basically indifferent to the co-defendants' requested relief is
suggestive of a perception of a lack of irreparable harm to the debtor's estate if
the injunction does not issue. Failure to extend the stay herein would not ad-
versely or detrimentally influence or pressure Manville through the co-defend-
ants. This is because the interests of Manville and the co-defendants at the
individual trial level are not so interwoven as to create that undue influence.
Thus, at least conceptually, a creditor does not impact Manville directly by
proceeding against the co-defendants.
GAF Corp. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In Re Johns-Manville Corp), 26 B.R. 405, 417
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983). The only difference between the Manville joint tortfeasors and
the fraudulent officers is that Manville was not bound by an indemnification agreement
but rather could only be held for contribution. Similarly, in the case of an executive who
has injured creditors through fraud, that executive would not be eligible for indemnifica-
tion because of the conduct requirements.
"so See supra note 7.
15' This is due to the good faith requirement in most state indemnification statutes.
State indemnification statutes offer a variety of standards that permit corporate officer
indemnification. There are nonexclusive, partially exclusive and completely exclusive in-
demnification statutes. Nonexclusive statutes allow states to indemnify in circumstances
other than those in the statute. Exclusive statutes do not allow corporations to indem-
nify conduct not covered in the statute. Some states have adopted partially exclusive
statutes. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 721 (McKinney 1986). All indemnification stat-
utes require that the executive's conduct be in good faith and reasonably believed to be
in the best interests of the corporation. See Bucy, supra note 12, at 283.
'12 Courts that extend stay protection in questionable circumstances usually recog-
nize that a strict interpretation of section 362 will work a hardship on the estate and the
reorganization. The Code, however, must be adhered to, as
Congress has enacted a Bankruptcy Code with a fairly complicated system of
statutory checks and balances designed to further a variety of interests. The
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The court in Lomas v. Northern Trust5 3 is a primary cul-
prit, erroneously extending the Robins test to protect indepen-
dently liable officers. The Robins court was careful not to extend
section 362 to instances where the executives were indepen-
dently liable to a creditor of the debtor. The expansion em-
ployed by the Robins court comported with the text, intent and
provisions of the Code.'" However, the Lomas court extended
stay protection to the officers, despite a strong showing of
fraud,1 5 reasoning that the mere risk of indemnification claims
to the debtor would diminish the debtor's estate.0
The Lomas court fashioned an argument that it claimed fell
within the "unusual circumstances" outlined in A.H. Robins.0 7
This reliance was disingenuous as the Lomas court made no
mention of the Robins dicta which exempted the application of
section 362 to those situations where a defendant was "indepen-
problem arises when the bankruptcy judge believes, rightly or wrongly, that
strict compliance with the letter of the statute may defeat rather than further
the underlying policy of favoring reorganizations.
Charles J. Tabb, Emergency Preferential Orders in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 65 Am
BANKn. L.J. 75, 110 (1991).
Compare CAE Industries Ltd. v. Aerospace Holdings Co., 116 B.R. 31 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (despite an indemnification agreement between CEO and corporate debtor, CEO's
individual liability prevented extension of section 362 stay) with Lomas Fin. Corp. v.
Northern Trust Co. (In re Lomas Fin. Corp.), 117 B.R. 64 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (de-
spite an indemnification deductible of only $10,000 and strong showing of fraudulent
misrepresentation on the part of debtor's officers, court extended protection to officers
via section 362 stay).
15' Lomas Fin. Corp. v. Northern Trust Co. (In re Lomas Fin. Corp.), No. 89-6602A
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1990).
'1 For a discussion of the Robins holding, see supra notes 53-59 and accompanying
text.
I" Defendants-Appellant's Brief at 4, Lomas Fin. Corp. v. Northern Trust Co. (In
re Lomas Fin. Corp.), 932 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 90-5059).
Lomas, slip op. at 13.
151 The bankruptcy court held that since the facts in Lomas fell within the "unusual
circumstances" test
if the Northern Trust Lawsuit is not enjoined, Lomas' estate and creditors will
incur the burden of litigation for an alleged pre-petition cause of action. This
is precisely the type of activity and burden which § 362 of the Code was in-
tended to alleviate. The Northern Trust Lawsuit is a transparent attempt to
end run the automatic stay. The Northern Trust Lawsuit which seeks, inter
alia, damages of $20 million from two Lomas officers, "in their individual ca-
pacities," is an attempt by Northern Trust to collect on a prepetition loan of




dently liable."1 8 The officers in Lomas were, in all probability,
independently liable for the damages incurred by Northern.'
Were the fraud action to be successful, their fraudulent conduct
would make them ineligible for indemnification.1 0 Thus, the
risk that the Lomas estate would be affected adversely by the
action was slim. Therefore, under Robins, the automatic stay
should not have been extended to protect the executives in
Lomas.
A section 362 analysis of third party claims focuses solely on
the relationship of the officer to the debtor (i.e., the existence of
a right to indemnification) 61 and not the potential impact on
'4 Robins, 788 F.2d at 999.
169 A cause of action for deceit is comprised of the following elements:
1. A false representation made by the defendant. In the ordinary case, this
representation must be one of fact.
2. Knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant that the representation is
false-or, what is regarded as equivalent, that he has not a sufficient basis of
information to make it. This element often is given the technical name of
"scienter."
3. An intention to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from action in reliance
upon the misrepresentation.
4. Justifiable reliance upon the representation on the part of the plaintiff, in
taking action or refraining from it.
5. Damage to the plaintiff, resulting from such reliance.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PRossER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTs § 105, at 728 (5th ed.
1984).
In Lomas Northern alleged damage arising out of the misrepresentations made by
Lomas officers regarding the loan agreement that was executed between them. The Lo.
mas officers knew that their representation concerning the net worth of Lomas would
induce Northern to advance $20 million under its obligation in the loan agreement.
Delaware General Corporation Law section 145 provides that a corporation can in-
demnify an officer provided that "he acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably
believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation. In a criminal
proceeding, which can include a fraud action, the officer can be indemnified if he had no
reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful." Bucy, supra note 12, at 66. The
Lomas financial officers knew their misrepresentation of Lomas's net worth would induce
Northern to lend the $20 million. There was no other reason for the representation than
to trigger Northern's obligations under the loan agreement.
160 Because of the conduct restrictions on indemnification agreements and D & 0
insurance policies, an officer who has voluntarily committed an act that was either in bad
faith or dishonest (as defined by the insurance or indemnification agreement) is not eligi-
ble for reimbursement from either source. This officer is deemed to have independent
liability to the creditor on the claim. See Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d
1276 (2d Cir. 1969) (corporate officer was not entitled to indemnification because one
cannot be insured against voluntary conduct), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
"I Because section 362 prevents any action against the debtor and property of the
estate, extending section 362 protection to solvent executives requires a finding that the
action is really against the debtor. Some courts refer to this as the identity of interest
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the creditor bringing the action.1 62 As a result, a section 362
analysis disrupts the delicate balance between the rights of the
damaged creditor to recover and the needs of a debtor to reor-
ganize. This is problematic because section 362 gives very little
discretion to the court to tailor the stay to the facts in a particu-
lar petition. 68 Consequently, extending the stay to solvent third
parties provides overbroad protection from suit. Limiting the
scope of section 362 to actions against the debtor and property
of the estate mitigates the risk that corts will extend overbroad
and potentially unwarranted immunity from suit to solvent
executives.
c. Property of the Estate: Director and Officer Liability
Insurance
Many courts have rejected the analysis of Lomas.2" These
test. See North Star Contracting Corp. v. McSpedon (In re North Star Contracting
Corp.), 125 B.R. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (the automatic stay can be extended when such an
identity of interests exists between the debtor and the third party). The problem with
this analysis is that it assumes that the executive is eligible for indemnification either
from the company or from an insurance policy. As a result of this assumption, the court
deems the action one against the estate without evaluating the real chances the executive
has for reimbursement. Consequently, an action against an individually liable officer, i.e.,
one who would not be eligible for reimbursement, could be stayed under the identity of
interests test. The result is that fraudulent executives enjoy bankruptcy protection and
creditors who are harmed by individual conduct are enjoined from suing during the du-
ration of the bankruptcy.
XGZ The creditor whose action is stayed is damaged by the unwarranted delay. Wait-
ing until after the company emerges from bankruptcy to pursue a cause of action against
a solvent officer is a heavy burden for any creditor to carry, made insulting by the fact
that the officer is independently liable on the creditor's claim. The final compounding of
this derogation of a creditor's rights to those of the debtor is the fact that in many
instances, the debtor did not even have to demonstrate a clear and irreparable threat to
the estate to take the right to sue away from a creditor. See generally G.H. Ishii-Chang,
Litigation and Bankruptcy: The Dilemma of the Codefendant Stay, 63 An. BANm. LJ.
257 (1989).
"I A section 362 stay lasts for the duration of the bankruptcy proceeding unless a
creditor successfully petitions the court to lift the stay. Unlike a regular Rule 65 injunc-
tion where the benefiting party must make a new showing of harm when the injunction
expires in order to obtain another, the automatic stay requires the stayed party to seek
relief under to section 362(d) if the stay is to be lifted. This is a burden that Rule 65
avoids by allowing the court to limit the duration of an injunction and forcing the party
benefiting from the injunction to show continued irreparable harm if the injunction is to
be extended.
I"4 See CAE Industries Ltd. v. Aerospace Holdings Co., 116 B.R. 31 (S.D-N.Y. 1990)
(denying extension of a stay, despite existence of indemnification agreement, citing the
extreme differences between the instant (no real threat to the debtor's reorganization)
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courts limit section 362 to actions against the debtor and prop-
erty of the estate. An issue that arises-even when the scope of
the stay is limited to the debtor and property of the estate-is
whether Director and Officer liability insurance ("D & 0") pro-
ceeds constitute property of the estate'e16 -and if so, whether an
action against an insured officer is essentially an action to obtain
possession of estate property in violation of the automatic
stay.168 Courts that stay these actions conclude that the creditor
is only seeking to recover from the officers in order to obtain a
judgment from the D & 0 insurance policy, thereby collecting a
larger judgment than would otherwise be recovered under a plan
action and the facts present in both Manville and Robins); In re Crazy Eddie Securities
Litig., 104 B.R. 582 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (automatic stay did not bar action against solvent
defendants where liability rested on individual breach); Ripley v. Mulroy, 80 B.R. 17
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (a fraud action commenced by a creditor against the president and con-
trolling shareholder of the debtor was not in violation of section 362(a) as the claims
asserted in the fraud action were distinct from those brought against the debtor); All
Seasons Resorts, Inc. v. Milner (In re All Seasons Resorts, Inc.), 79 B.R. 901 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1987) (citing lack of "special circumstances" that justify extension of automatic
stay to solvent third parties, despite existence of indemnification agreement); Supermer-
cado Gamboa, Inc. v. Camara De Commerciantes Mayoristas De Puerto Rico, Inc. (In re
Supermercado Gamboa, Inc.), 68 B.R. 230 (Bankr. D. P.R. 1986). The Supermercado
court denied the debtor's motion for an extension of section 362, stating:
If Congress intended to expand the scope of this extraordinary statutory provi-
sion, imposing an ex parte injunction upon the world as to actions against the
debtor and its property, it would I believe have used more precise language to
achieve that result. Indeed, where expanded scope of the automatic stay
against codebtors was intended ... Congress did make explicit the further stay
of actions against codebtors who themselves were not debtors in the bank-
ruptcy proceeding.
Supermercado, 68 B.R. at 232.
161 In both Robins and Johns-Manville the courts extended stay protection to the
insurers and the respective policies on the theory that the liability insurance is the most
valuable asset of the estate in mass tort litigation. The Manville court stated:
To permit the third party actions to continue against Manville's insurance car-
riers will result in a multiplicity of positions and defenses on the part of the
insurance carriers and will most likely result in inconsistent decisions and rul-
ings concerning the coverage and liability of the insurance carriers to the third
party claimants and to Manville. Such a disorganized and fragmented proce-
dure for resolving such major issues will undermine Manville's attempt at
reorganization.
GAF Corp. v. Johns Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.) 26 B.R. 405, 436
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
1I By deeming the D & 0 policy property of the estate, an action by a creditor
against an officer who is covered by the policy can be interpreted as essentially an act to
obtain property of the estate in violation of the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. §
362(a)(3), supra note 2.
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of reorganization. 1 7
The status of D & 0 insurance in bankruptcy is muddled at
best.168 Some courts hold that D & 0 insurance is property of
the estate under all circumstances. e69 Other courts evaluate the
relationship between the policy and the debtor more critically to
determine the maximum obligation the debtor could incur under
the policy.1 0 One court has gone so far as to hold that since the
policy did not increase the debtor's assets or reduce its liabili-
ties, the policy was not property of the estate.17 1
But determining whether D & 0 insurance policies are
property of the estate in the abstract is an impossible task.
Courts are far better off examining the specific circum-
stances-the conduct of the officers under the policy and the
likelihood that the debtor will incur costs as a result of judgment
against the officers-in determining whether potential harm to a
debtor triggers a stay. 7 2 In situations like Lomas, where the
16 See Circle K Corp. v. Marks (In re Circle K Corp.), 121 B.R. 257 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1990) (staying creditors actions against solvent officers, deeming D & 0 insurance prop-
erty of the estate); but see Zenith Lab., Inc. v. Sinay (In re Zenith Lab., Inc.), 104 B.R.
659, 665 (D.N.J. 1989) (refusing to extend protection under section 362 despite existence
of D & 0 insurance policy stating that an insurance policy is only property of the estate
"to the extent that it increases the debtor's worth or diminishes its liabilities").
1es Compare Minoco Group of Co.'s, Ltd. v. First State Underwriters Agency (In re
Minoco Group of Co.'s, Ltd.), 799 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that D & 0 Insur-
ance policy was property of the estate) with Louisiana World Exposition, Inc. v. FDIC
(In re Louisiana World Exposition, Inc.), 832 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1987) (D & 0 policy
proceeds were not property of the estate, but rather belonged to the officers covered
imder the policies).
169 See Circle K Corp. v. Marks (In re Circle K Corp.), 121 B.R. 257, 258-59 (Bankr.
D. Ariz. 1990) (holding D & 0 insurance proceeds to be property of the estate because of:
(1) the difficulty of attracting and retaining competent personnel to serve as officers and
directors if the policies were canceled; and (2) the increase in claims against the debtor's
estate resulting from claims for indemnification).
170 See, e.g., In re Metro Transp. Co., 82 B.R. 351, 353-54 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988)
(court expressly agreed to lift stay if plaintiffs agreed to limit claims to the amount of
the insurance policy).
171 See Zenith Lab., Inc. v. Sinay (In re Zenith Lab., Inc.), 104 B.R. 659 (D.N.J.
1989). The court failed to find the D & 0 insurance policies property of the estate, stat-
ing that something is property of the estate "only to the extent that it increan the
debtor's worth or diminishes its liabilities." Id. at 665.
172 The requirement of good faith in indemnification statutes has a corollary in D &
0 insurance known as the dishonesty clause. Just as indemnification statutes bar recov-
ery for acts made in bad faith, most D & 0 policies contain dishonesty clauses. The
following is a sample D & 0 dishonesty clause:
The insurer shall not be liable to make any payment for Ioc= in connection
with any claim or claims made against the insureds... brought about or con-
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plaintiffs made a strong showing of fraud, it was doubtful that
the officers would have been eligible for either indemnification
or insurance.17 3 Restricting the scope of section 362 to actions
against the debtor, particularly when a solvent executive is indi-
vidually liable on the, claim, prevents the confusion of determin-
ing whether in the abstract the D & 0 insurance is property of
the estate. By determining whether the exhaustion of a D & 0
insurance policy would result in irreparable harm to the estate
under section 105 and Rule 65, courts are compelled to balance
the competing risks: the greater the likelihood the policy will be
depleted and the debtor will be forced to indemnify, the greater
the level of harm to the debtor andone more reason for a stay to
issue.1"4 Conversely, the less likely that the officer is eligible for
insurance or indemnification on account of her conduct, the less
harm the estate will suffer and therefore, the less likely an in-
junction should issue. In short, section 105 and Rule 65 force a
better inquiry than section 362: whether there is a risk of harm
to the debtor under the insurance contracts is a far better ques-
tion than whether an insurance contract that neither increases a
debtor's assets nor depletes its liabilities is property of the
estate.
tributed to by the fraudulent, dishonest or criminal acts of the insureds, how-
ever the provisions of this exclusion shall not apply unless a judgment or other
final adjudication thereof adverse to the insureds shall establish fraud, dishon-
esty or criminal acts.
Bucy, supra note 12, at 26. These clauses are included and enforced under the argument
that one cannot be insured against voluntary conduct. Id.
173 If an officer is not eligible for indemnification due to the nature of the conduct,
and if the insurance policy contains a dishonesty clause, it is doubtful that the executive
would be entitled to recover reimbursement from the policy proceeds.
174 In CAE Industries Ltd. v. Aerospace Holdings Co., 116 B.R. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1990),
the debtor's president made a motion to extend the stay to a tortious interference claim
brought against him by creditors of the debtor corporation. Despite the existence af an
indemnification agreement between the officer and the debtor, the court refused to ex-
tend the stay. Evaluating the motion under section 362, the court reasoned that "if an
extension of the stay 'would work a hardship on plaintiffs, by giving an unwarrantedimmunity from suit to solvent co-defendants', which would contravene the purposes un-
derlying the automatic stay, then the stay should be denied." Id. at 32 (quoting Fortier
v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324, 1330 (10th Cir. 1984)). This reasoning is
sound because the court viewed the officer and the debtor corporation jointly and sever-
ally liable for the injuries to the parties seeking to recover, thereby making them joint
tortfeasors and not indispensable parties. This analysis is more consistent with a section
105 inquiry into a balancing of interests than with a section 362 evaluation of only the
impact to the estate.
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B. Section 105: The Appropriate Standard
The only statutory alternative in extending bankruptcy pro-
tection to solvent corporate officers is section 105 of the Code.
Courts are split, however, on what standard should be applied
before the issuance of a section 105 injunction.7 One group re-
quires the movant to meet the four-pronged test of Rule 65 as
applied to the Bankruptcy Code through Bankruptcy Procedure
Rule 7065.178 The other group does not require that any of the
Rule 65 factors be met before issuing a section 105 injunction,
not even a showing of irreparable harm.117 This latter approach
is faulty because it deprives a creditor from bringing a cause of
action against a third party without a corresponding show of
harm to the debtor's estate .1 7  A strict section 105 standard
before the issuance of an injunction meets both the needs of
creditors and debtors by only staying actions that would actually
harm the debtor's estate.
175 For a comparison of judicial interpretations of section 105, see supra, notes 92-
120.
'76 Bankruptcy Rule 7065 is identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. See
Otero Mills, Inc. v. Security Bank & Trust (In re Otero Mills), 21 B.R. 777 (Bankr. D.
N.ML 1982). The court in Green v. Drexler (In re Feit & Drexler, Inc.), 760 F.2d 406 (2d
Cir. 1985) interpreted the bankruptcy Rule 65 test to require:
(1) that movant is likely to suffer irreparable injury if relief is denied; and
(2) that there is either likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious
questions going to the merits to make them fair ground for litigation, with
balance of hardships tipping decidedly in applicants favor.
Id. at 415. A number of courts interpret the likelihood of success on the merits as
whether the debtor will be able to complete a plan of reorganization. Since the extension
of third party stays arises relatively early in the case, most courts will accept the barest
hope that the debtor will be able to reorganize.
177 Courts that adopt this approach either hold that the Rule 65 requirements are
not applicable or interpret the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court as a provision of the
Code within the meaning of section 105. See LTV Steel Co. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Cleve-
land City School District (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 93 BLR. 26, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("The
usual grounds for injunctive relief such as irreparable injury need not be ahowM in a
proceeding for an injunction under section 105(a).").
178 In describing the heavy burden a movant must show before the issuance of an
injunction, the court in Costa & Head Land Co. v. National Bank of Commerce (In re
Costa & Head Land Co.), 68 B.R. 296 (ND. Ala. 1986) stated:
[The cases all make it clear that injunctive relief is an extraordinary and dras-
tic remedy with the burden of proof being on the debtor to establish under the
traditional requirements that it is entitled to injunctive relief. If the debtor
fails to satisfy this burden, the injunction may not issue.
Id. at 298 (citing Glassman v. Electronic Theatre Restaurants Corp. (In re Electronic
Theatre Restaurants Corp.), 53 B.R. 458, 462-63 (N.D. Ohio 1985)).
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1. Requiring the Risk of Irreparable Harm to the Estate
Injunctive relief should be issued sparingly and in extraordi-
nary circumstances only when no remedy at law exists. 1 e A
showing of irreparable harm is the threshold requirement for
both a Rule 65 injunction and a section 105 stay.180 The Lomas
179 The court in In re Arrow Huss, Inc., 51 B.R. 853 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) de-
scribed the burden under section 105:
The movant's burden of proof is a heavy one and must be supported by sub-
stantial evidence, the quantum of which will necessarily vary depending on the
scope and duration of the stay sought. The movant must make out a clear
showing of hardship and adverse impact on the reorganization case if there is
even a fair possibility that the stay will prejudice an adverse party.
Id. at 859. An extreme example of an attempt to extend section 105 was a motion made
by Integrated Resources, Inc. (the limited partnership syndicator and manager then op-
erating in chapter 11) against Beigel & Sandier, Ltd., a plaintiffs class action firm then
representing approximately 2,600 of the estimated 29,000 Integrated limited partners na-
tionwide. The motion sought to enjoin Beigel & Sandier, under section 105, from advis-
ing their clients to stop payment on the clients' promissory notes because Integrated was
defaulting on its obligations under the terms of the notes. Integrated argued that by
advising their clients to stop payment on the notes, Beigel & Sandier was preventing
Integrated from upstreaming the cash in order to facilitate its reorganization. As a result,
Integrated argued, Beigel & Sandler was interfering with Integrated's reorganization and
should be enjoined under section 105. See Plaintiff's Complaint & Memorandum of Law,
Integrated Resources, Inc. v. Beigel & Sandler, Ltd. (In re Integrated Resources, Inc.),
No. 90 B 10411 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 26, 1991). At the hearing on the motion, the bank-
ruptcy court advised Integrated that it should negotiate a resolution to the problem with
Beigel & Sandier as it would not be satisfied with the result if it forced the court the
make a determination on the applicability of section 105. See Hearing Transcript, Inte-
grated Resources, Inc. v. Beigel & Sandier, Ltd. (In re Integrated Resources, Inc.), No. 90
B 10411 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 1991).
180 See GAF Corp. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 26 B.R.
405 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (in order for a section 105 injunction to issue, the movant
must satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule Civil Procedure 65); Tucker Anthony Re-
alty Corp. v. Schlesinger, 888 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1989) (a preliminary injunction is only
proper after a showing of irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the merits or
the balance of equities tipping decidedly in favor of the movant). Justice Cardozo stated
in Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936), that:
[T]he suppliant for a stay must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity
in being required to go forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay
for which he prays will work damage to some one else. Only in rare circum-
stances will a litigant in one cause be compelled to stand aside while a litigant
in another settles the rule of law that will define the rights of both.
Id. at 255. A case that adopted this strict standard is Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.
LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 76 B.R. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). The court vacated a
bankruptcy court order enjoining actions against the debtor's pension plans. The court
held that one of the prongs of Rule 65-that the activity enjoined would cause harm to
the estate and its reorganization-had not been met and that issuance of the injunction
should therefore fail. Id. at 949. By resisting the lure of an overbroad reach of section
105, bankruptcy courts that adopt the narrow view and remain within the confines of
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court, however, stated that "[s]ince injunctions in bankruptcy
cases are authorized by statute, the usual grounds for relief, such
as irreparable damage need not be shown."1 81 The Lomas court
erroneously read out of section 105 the requirement of irrepara-
ble harm 82 and thus took the teeth out of what should be an
otherwise heavy burden for the movant.5 3
Section 105 was never intended by Congress to give bank-
ruptcy courts free reign to enjoin parties not before them. Where
an injunction issues under section 105, the standard should be
the same as that "for the usual issuance of injunctions": the
Rule 65 standard. When an injunction is issued to stop an action
between two parties who have not sought the protection of the
Rule 65 are merely requiring what other federal courts must before issuing injunctions.
281 Lomas Fin. Corp. v. Northern Trust Co. (In re Lomas Fin. Corp.), No. 89-6602A,
slip op. at 15 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1990) (citing Garrity v. Leffler (In re Neuman),
71 B.R. 567, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
182 The case cited for the proposition that irreparable harm need not be shown
before a section 105 injunction is issued is In re Neuman, 71 B.R. at 571. The Neuman
court reasoned that since section 105 is exempted from the Anti-Injunction Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2283 (1978), which prohibits federal courts from enjoining state court actions in
most circumstances, and that since this exception was "expressly authorized," Neuman,
71 B.R. at 571 (citing S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5815), then the usual equitable grounds for relief, such as irreparable
damage, need not be shown. Neuman, 71 B.R. at 571.
The Neuman court cited Henderson v. Burd, 133 F.2d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 1943), for
the proposition that the moving party need not show a risk of irreparable harm. This
reliance was misplaced. In Henderson the court was faced with a suit under the Emer-
gency Price Control Act of 1942, (The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 is codified in
50 U.S.C. appendix section 901) as to whether an alleged violator of the Act could be
enjoined from selling pantyhose at above maximum prices. The court held that the con-
duct could be enjoined absent a showing of irreparable harm, because "[w]here an in-
junction is authorized by statute it is enough if the statutory conditions are satisfied."
Henderson, 133 F.2d at 517 (citing SEC v. Torr, 87 F.2d 446, 450 (2d Cir. 1937)).
It is erroneous to apply this rule to section 105. The statutory conditions of section
105 are not explicitly stated, but rather are implicit in the legislative commentary that
accompany it: the Rule 65 standard. The most critical element of a rule 65 injunction is
the showing of irreparable harm to the movant if the injunction does not issue. Accord-
ingly, the precedent of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 is erroneous because
that Act specifically did away with an irreparable harm requirement under certain cir-
cumstances. That is not the case with section 105. The legislative comment to section
105 requires an irreparable harm standard.
183 Explaining this heavy burden, the Manville court stated: '"The suppliant for a
stay must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward,
if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will work damage to
someone else ... ." GAF Corp. v. Johns-lManville. (In re Johns.Manville), 26 B.R. 405,
417 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (quoting In re Mass. Asbestos Case, M.D.L. Nos. 1 & 2 (D.
Mass. Sept. 28, 1982), slip op. at 3).
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court, equity demands that the court be very circumspect before
issuing an injunction.1 ' Through misinterpretation of precedent
courts have dismissed the irreparable harm requirement, depriv-
ing a creditor's right of action against a third party without a
corresponding showing of irreparable harm.
2. A Strict Section 105 Standard: Equitable Results
Demanding that a movant satisfy a Rule 65 threshold before
enjoining actions against a solvent officer is particularly neces-
sary when the officer is independently liable to the creditor.
Under these circumstances, the creditor is pursuing a separate
cause of action against the officer, whose liability rests on indi-
vidual conduct and not derivative liability.185 Permitting a
harmed creditor to proceed against a tortfeasor, e.g., an officer of
a debtor corporation, is equitable. If, however, the suit will cause
irreparable harm to the estate, the debtor can establish under a
strict Rule 65 analysis that an injunction protecting the officer
from suit should issue. Without a requirement of irreparable
harm before the issuance of a section 105 injunction, actions are
stayed infriging upon creditors rights. This result is particularly
inequitable in situations where potential harm to the debtor is
minimal thus making the injunction unwarranted.
CONCLUSION
The Bankruptcy Code attempts to balance three competing
interests: that of the debtor, seeking to reorganize; that of the
creditor, seeking to recoup losses; and that of the public, seeking
to preserve valuable enterprises and prevent the misuse of capi-
tal.8 e These interests must be balanced to achieve equitable re-
I8 See Venture Properties, Inc. v. Norwood Group, Inc. (In re Venture Properties,
Inc.), 37 B.R. 175, 177 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1984) (denying injunctive relief to debtor stating
"[ilt has been a cardinal principle of bankruptcy law from the beginning that its effects
do not normally benefit those who have not themselves 'come into' the bankruptcy court
with their liabilities and all their assets").
" The officer and the debtor are joint tortfeasors, meaning that they are jointly and
severally liable as in Manville, and the creditor is merely pursuing the party not pro-
tected by the bankruptcy stay.
,86 Costa & Head Land Co. v. National Bank of Commerce (In re Costa & Head
Land Co.), 68 B.R. 296, 303 (N.D. Ala 1986). The Head Land court held that partners of
the debtor had failed to meet the stiff requirements of section 105 and were not entitled
to an injunction. Discussing the difference between the public interest and the purpose
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sults. The current trend of extending sections 362 and 105 to
enjoin actions against third parties without a corresponding
Rule 65 threshold showing of harm elevates the interests of the
debtor over those of the creditor and the public. Under Rule 65,
the court is required to address all three of these interests before
granting an injunction, thereby maintaining the delicate statu-
tory balance.
The Bankruptcy Code's overriding purpose to rehabilitate
the debtor does not-grant uninhibited injunctive power to bank-
ruptcy courts. Limiting the application of section 362 to the
debtor and property of the estate and requiring a Rule 65 stan-
dard for section 105 injunctions not only complies with Con-
gress's intent in enacting the code, but also serves the significant
public interest in deterring fraudulent executives from seeking
the protection of bankruptcy court.
Elizabeth H. Winchester
of the bankruptcy code, the court stated:
There is, or should be, a distinction between the "public interest" and the
"overall philosophy of the Bankruptcy Code." If the bankruptcy court can be
said to have found that its injunction will not adversely affect the public inter-
est that finding is no more than an expansion upon the theme that whoever
interferes with the affairs of a bankrupt debtor, however tangential or indirect
that "interference" may be, trespasses upon the concept of debtor protection
and therefore trespasses upon the "public interest." The philosophy of the
Bankruptcy Code and the "public interest" do not constitute an absolute and
inevitable equation.
Id. at 303.
1992]

